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Natural resource funds—sovereign wealth funds financed by natural  
resource revenues—seem to be en vogue for oil-, gas- and mineral-  
rich countries. Each time a discovery is made, advisors, politicians  
and government officials begin discussing the establishment of a  
fund. In some cases, this arises out of a legitimate concern about the  
potential impacts that large, volatile and exhaustible natural resource 
revenues will have on the economy. In others, it comes from a desire  
to ensure the transparent and accountable management of expected 
revenue flows, especially on the heels of many stories of severe  
revenue mismanagement.
Perhaps the most famous story of squandered wealth comes from Nauru, an island nation in the 
South Pacific. In the 1970s, phosphate mining transformed Nauru from one of the world’s poorest 
nations into one of its richest on a per capita basis; by 1973, its GDP peaked at $178 million, or 
$25,500 per citizen (in 2005 dollars). But overconsumption and poor revenue management—the 
Nauru government once even financed an ill-fated musical in London’s West End—quickly erased 
this expansion; by 2007, its GDP had shrunk to less than $19 million, or $1,900 per citizen. The 
economy has never recovered, and the government is fiscally troubled.
Had Nauru created a natural resource fund, perhaps this collapse in per capita income could  
have been avoided. Drawing on lessons from Nauru’s and others’ experiences, some governments 
have established funds to help them manage the revenues from these non-renewable natural 
resources. Not only can they be a source of savings, but funds have also helped mitigate budget 
volatility, improving development planning and public investment decisions. They have also 
helped sterilize large inflows of foreign capital in order to prevent destabilization of the economy 
and of domestic power structures. In other words, some funds have helped governments escape 
the so-called “resource curse.”
At the same time, the rhetoric of natural resource funds as symbols of transparency and good  
governance risks overstating their practical value as solutions to specific macroeconomic or  
budgetary problems. Transparency and good governance do not depend on the presence of  
a natural resource fund. In some places, some funds have been created simply to act as slush 
funds for ruling regimes, serving as channels for patronage and corruption.
Foreword
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This report—the product of an 18-month collaboration between the Revenue Watch Institute- 
Natural Resource Charter and the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Invest-
ment—sheds light on the current governance of natural resource funds around the world.  
An in-depth analysis of 22 funds reveals that the establishment of funds has benefited citizens  
in a number of countries and subnational jurisdictions, as in Chile, Norway, some Persian  
Gulf countries and several U.S. states. Yet about half of all funds are too opaque to study  
comprehensively, raising serious questions about how this money is being used (or misused). 
Some funds provide far too little information, as in Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Kuwait, 
Mexico, Russia and Qatar, despite these countries’ subscription to the Santiago Principles, a  
set of voluntary good governance guidelines for sovereign wealth funds.
Elsewhere, self-declared stabilization funds, as in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Venezuela, have failed to stabilize their respective budgets. Even advanced economies’ funds 
are not immune to problems; despite sky-high production and periods of elevated prices, only 
two relatively small deposits were made into Canada’s Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund from 
1987 to 2013.
Thanks to lessons learned, today there is a trend toward establishing strict rules for managing  
deposits, withdrawals and investment risk through legislation or regulation. Funds are also 
becoming more transparent. Nevertheless, opposition to governance rules for natural resource 
funds is still too common.
The proliferation of natural resource funds over the last decade is a trend that seems set to  
continue. Given the sums involved, how natural resource funds are governed and how resource 
revenues are managed are of critical importance to resource-rich countries. The policy options 
detailed in this report, designed to guide decision-making where funds exist or are being created, 
will enhance the likelihood that funds will serve their stated objectives and the public interest.
Daniel Kaufmann
President 
Revenue Watch Institute-Natural Resource Charter
Lisa Sachs
Director 








Natural resource funds—a subset of sovereign wealth funds—held approximately $3.5 trillion in 
assets as of the end of 2013. This money, which belongs to the public and comes from extraction 
of non-renewable resources, should serve the public interest. Governments can use these funds to 
cover budget deficits when resource revenues decline; to save for future generations; to earmark 
for national development projects; or to help mitigate Dutch disease by investing abroad. They 
can also be used to reduce spending volatility, in turn improving the quality of public spending, 
promoting growth and reducing poverty, and protect oil, gas and mineral revenues from  
corruption. Citizens in Chile, Norway, some Persian Gulf countries and some U.S. states have 
experienced these benefits. 
Unfortunately, poor natural resource fund governance has often undermined public financial 
management systems and funds have been used as sources of patronage and nepotism, with  
dramatic results. Ostensibly designed to steady macroeconomic management or set aside savings 
for the future, many funds have lacked clear goals or rules, and thus have complicated public 
finance without making it more effective. And in places like Angola and Russia, they have been 
used to avoid public scrutiny, facilitating billions of dollars in wasteful spending. 
The Natural Resource Fund Project 
The Revenue Watch Institute-Natural Resource Charter (RWI-NRC) and the Vale Columbia Center 
on Sustainable International Investment (VCC) surveyed 22 natural resource funds worldwide, 
covering 18 national and subnational jurisdictions. The research methodology for these fund 
profiles drew on a number of resources for its analytical framework, including Edwin Truman’s 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Scoreboard, RWI-NRC’s 2013 Resource Governance Index and the Santiago 
Principles. Each profile is the product of in-depth study of the laws, regulations and policies  
governing one or a set of funds in a given country or subnational jurisdiction. Primary sources 
were used when available and all profiles were peer-reviewed by sovereign wealth fund experts, 
based in-country where possible. 
Lessons from these case studies crystalized into five policy briefs examining fund management, 
investments, transparency and accountability to the public, as well as the fiscal rules that govern 
them. This policy overview is a summary of the project’s findings and conclusions. Detailed  
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Policy Overview Why does natural resource fund governance matter?
Poor fund governance has resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in oil, gas and mineral sales. 
For instance, due to excessive risk-taking and lack of oversight, the Libyan Investment Author-
ity lost much of a $1.2 billion investment in equity and currency derivatives following the 2008 
financial crisis. From the mid-1980s to 1992, the Kuwait Investment Authority lost $5 billion on 
poor investments in Spanish firms. An absence of internal controls, supervision and transpar-
ency made possible not only mismanagement of assets but also high commissions and profits 
for insiders. The opacity of many natural resource funds provides a fertile environment in which 
these maladies can fester; of the 54 natural resource funds we have identified globally, half are too 
opaque to study comprehensively, raising questions about how they are being used or misused. 
The indirect costs of poor natural resource fund governance may be even greater. Many natural 
resource funds either do not serve a well-defined purpose or do not meet their objectives. One 
self-declared savings fund, the Canadian province of Alberta’s Heritage Savings Trust Fund, failed 
to save for much of a 25-year period, contributing to inflation and encouraging unsustainable 
consumption. And some self-declared stabilization funds have failed to mitigate expenditure 
volatility caused by swings in oil prices (e.g., Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Trinidad and Tobago,  
Venezuela). Expenditure volatility makes planning for the future, both by the government and  
the private sector, more difficult, leading to poor investment decisions. Additionally, when  
spending increases too quickly, money is often wasted on legacy projects such as concert halls 
and monuments, or can cause inflation. When spending is cut too quickly, roads are left half- 
built and economies can experience significant unemployment or bankruptcies. 
Key findings
Natural resource funds are increasingly popular; 30 of the 54 funds currently active were estab-
lished since 2000, with authorities in more than a dozen more countries considering or planning 
new funds.1 Among both new and older funds, there is a clear trend toward codifying (in legisla-
tion or regulation) governance requirements, such as rules determining which types of revenues 
must be deposited, or rules detailing the management roles of different government agencies. 
Transparency requirements and checks on corruption and patronage are often inadequate. We 
find that only about half of the funds in our sample of 18 release internal or external audits of 
their performance or publish the details of specific investments. Funds in Botswana, Equatorial 
Guinea, Iran, Kuwait, Mexico, Russia and Qatar remain relatively opaque despite their govern-
ments signing on to the Santiago Principles, a set of voluntary good governance standards. The 
Brunei Investment Agency, Equatorial Guinea’s Fund for Future Generations and the Libyan 
Investment Authority still keep nearly all information about their activities secret. Amidst the 
overall weakness in fund transparency, there are a growing number of funds that have begun to 
publish audits and information about returns and investment managers.
Some governments also resist even the most basic operational rules, leaving them at greater  
risk of not fulfilling their macroeconomic objectives. The governments of Abu Dhabi (UAE),  
Azerbaijan, Botswana, Iran, Kuwait, and Russia, for example, have been unwilling to impose  
withdrawal rules on their respective funds, while the governments of Abu Dhabi and Botswana 
have not imposed deposit rules.
Additionally, most governments permit domestic spending directly through their funds’ choices 
of asset holdings rather than through the budget process. This has undermined parliamentary  
accountability, democratic institutions and public financial management systems in some  
1  New funds are being planned or considered at the national level in Afghanistan, Israel, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Niger, Peru, Uganda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia and at the subnational level in many other countries. 
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countries. In Azerbaijan, for instance, government authorities have used the State Oil Fund 
(SOFAZ) to directly finance strategic government projects such as the railway between Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey. These expenditure items are not subject to the same reporting or public  
procurement requirements as those financed through the normal budget process, nor are they 
subject to as much parliamentary oversight. The Angola Sovereign Fund, the National Develop-
ment Fund of Iran, and Russia’s National Wealth Fund also bypass normal budgetary procedures 
and are used as vehicles for political patronage. In recognition of this danger—as well as the  
potential that domestic spending by the funds will undermine macroeconomic objectives like  
fiscal sterilization—some funds, including those in Abu Dhabi (UAE), Botswana, Chile, Ghana,  
Kazakhstan and Norway, have prohibited direct domestic investments.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, we argue that because of the risks associated with their  
existence outside the ordinary budget process, funds generally ought not to be used as vehicles  
for domestic investment through choices of domestic asset holdings. Instead, domestic  
spending of natural resource revenues should be made via withdrawals from the fund to the  
general or consolidated account, and can even be earmarked for specific health, education,  
infrastructure or sector-specific projects to encourage spending on development priorities.
The rhetorical appeal of natural resource funds as symbols of development and progress has 
sometimes outstripped their practical value as solutions to specific macroeconomic or  
budgetary problems. This lack of clarity represents a real danger, as poorly conceived funds  
can become channels for corruption.
Recommendations
We recommend that governments establishing or maintaining natural resource funds consider 
six steps that promote good natural resource fund governance, each of which is elaborated further 
in our other policy briefs:
 1.  Set clear fund objective(s) (e.g., saving for future generations; stabilizing the budget;  
earmarking natural resource revenue for development priorities).
 2.  Establish fiscal rules—for deposit and withdrawal—that align with the objective(s).
 3.  Establish investment rules (e.g., a maximum of 20 percent can be invested in equities)  
that align with the objective(s).
 4.  Clarify a division of responsibilities between the ultimate authority over the fund, the 
fund manager, the day-to-day operational manager, and the different offices within the 
operational manager, and set and enforce ethical and conflict of interest standards.
 5.  Require regular and extensive disclosures of key information (e.g., a list of specific  
investments; names of fund managers) and audits.
 6.  Establish strong independent oversight bodies to monitor fund behavior and  
enforce the rules.
Additionally, we stress that governments should establish these and other rules and institutions 
governing natural resource funds through a process that generates broad political consensus. 
Governments may not comply with even the best rules unless key stakeholders and the broader 
citizenry have bought into the need for government savings and constantly apply pressure to  
follow the rules. This has become apparent not just in natural resource-rich economies, but also  
in places like Europe where, from time to time, most member states breached the fiscal rules  
outlined in the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact even prior to the 2007-08 global financial crisis. 
Finally, we call on international institutions and advisers to carefully consider the implications of 
recommending the establishment of funds where public financial management systems are opaque 
Natural Resource Fund Governance: The EssentialsRevenue Watch Institute
6
Policy Overview and poorly functioning. International advisors should recognize that the establishment of a fund 
by itself will not improve resource governance. Rather, natural resource funds ought to be products 
of fiscal rules or macroeconomic frameworks that call for savings of oil, gas or mineral revenues. 
Minimum conditions (e.g., clear objectives, operational rules, investment risk limitations, effective 
oversight, transparency) must be present in order to improve natural resource governance. 
7
The Natural Resource Fund Project
Given their collective size—approximately $3.5 trillion in assets as of the end of 2013, and grow-
ing—and concerns about the motivations of their government owners, much has been written 
about natural resource funds (NRFs), their investments and their global influence.2 However, funds’ 
impacts on governance and public financial accountability at home has received far less attention.3
On the one hand, these funds can be used to serve the public interest—for example, by cover-
ing budget deficits when oil or mineral revenues decline, saving resource revenues for future 
generations, or helping to mitigate Dutch disease through fiscal sterilization.4 On the other hand, 
in many countries they have undermined public financial management and become sources of 
patronage and nepotism.
The Revenue Watch Institute-Natural Resource Charter (RWI-NRC) and the Vale Columbia  
Center on Sustainable International Investment (VCC) have conducted a worldwide survey  
of natural resource funds—a subset of sovereign wealth funds—examining their management, 
investments, transparency and accountability to the public, as well as the fiscal rules that govern 
them.5 The goal of the project is to better understand current fund governance practices in order 
to foster cross-country experience sharing and improve fund performance. The five policy  
briefs, 18 natural resource fund profiles, this policy overview, and associated website  
(www.revenuewatch.org/nrf) that constitute the project have been designed to equip government 
officials, policymakers, researchers and citizens with much of the necessary background and 
information to establish funds or reform existing ones. Each profile—whether it covers a national 
fund like Kazakhstan’s or a subnational fund like North Dakota’s (USA)—is the product of in-depth 
study of the laws, regulations and policies governing one or a set of funds in a given country, 
province or state. Primary sources were used when available and all profiles were peer-reviewed 
by sovereign wealth fund experts, based in-country where possible.
This policy overview summarizes our results and conclusions. It defines a natural resource fund 
and provides a synopsis of the basic elements of good fund governance and recent trends in fund 
governance. It also recaps the five separate policy briefs which cover:
 1. Institutional structure of natural resource funds
 2. Rules-based investment for natural resource funds
 3.  Fiscal rules for natural resource funds—how to develop and  
operationalize an appropriate rule
 4. Independent oversight of natural resource funds
 5. Natural resource fund transparency
2  For example: Clark, Gordon L., Adam D. Dixon and Ashby H.B. Monk, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Legitimacy, Governance, and Global Power. 
Princeton University Press: Princeton (2013); Bolton, Patrick, Frederic Samama and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), Sovereign Wealth Funds and 
Long-Term Investing. Colombia University Press: New York (2012); Truman, Edwin, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Threat or Salvation? Peterson 
Institute for International Economics: Washington, D.C. (2010); or the Financial Times and Guardian pages on sovereign wealth funds. 
3  Key publications include: Bacon, Robert and Silvana Tordo, Experiences with Oil Funds: Institutional and Financial Aspects. World Bank: Wash-
ington (2006); Collier, Paul and Anthony J. Venables (eds.), Plundered Nations? Successes and Failures in Natural Resource Extraction. Palgrave 
MacMillan: New York (2011); and Johnson-Calari, Jennifer and Malan Rietveld, Sovereign Wealth Management. Central Banking Publications: 
London (2007).
4  Dutch disease is a decline in the manufacturing or agricultural sectors caused by a large inflow of foreign currency into the economy from, 
for example, oil sales to foreigners. The inflow causes exchange rate appreciation or inflation, making exports less competitive. Also, labor 
and capital move into the “boom sector,” often the oil or mining sector, from the other sectors, further harming manufacturing or agricul-
tural competitiveness. Consumers may be harmed by a rise of prices of “non-tradeables” such as taxis, haircuts and restaurant meals. Fiscal 
sterilization—essentially placing foreign currency income back outside the economy—can help mitigate the Dutch disease.
5  The NRFs were chosen based on three criteria: interest from policymakers on their governance, availability of information and available 
resources. Over time we expect to expand the number of NRF profiles available on www.revenuewatch.org/nrf.
Natural Resource Fund Governance: The EssentialsRevenue Watch Institute
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Policy Overview What are natural resource funds, why are they established, and are they successful?
In 2010, approximately $1 trillion in oil and gas revenues alone were deposited into government 
accounts in resource-rich countries.6 Mineral production contributed tens of billions more to 
government coffers.7 These vast sums have the potential to transform economies for the better 
through public investments in health, education, infrastructure and social services, or through 
direct benefits to citizens. 
In most countries, the vast majority of resource revenues are spent through the national budget. 
However, they are often collected or distributed by accounts or entities other than the budget as 
well. In Ghana, for instance, more than 40 percent of oil revenues in 2011 were transferred to the 
state-owned Ghana National Oil Company.8 In Mongolia, a portion of mining revenues has been 
transferred directly to citizens via a cash transfer program. And in Indonesia, Nigeria and Peru, sub-
national governments receive a percentage of mineral or oil revenues according to a stated formula. 
The largest non-budgetary allocations of oil, gas or mining revenues have been to special funds, 
sometimes called sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) or natural resource funds (NRFs).9 A natural 
resource fund is a special-purpose investment fund owned by a government whose principal 
source of financing is revenue derived from oil, gas or mineral sales and that invests at least in 
part in foreign financial assets (see Box 1 for an explanation of the difference between natural 
resource funds and other extrabudgetary funds).10 This study has identified 54 such funds world-
wide (see Table 1 and Figure 1 for a full list and Figures 2 and 3 for a breakdown of the funds by 
size and source of financing). 
Natural resource funds have proliferated over the last decade. Since 2000, approximately 30 funds 
have been created (see Box 2 for a brief history of natural resource funds). Afghanistan, Israel, 
Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Peru, Uganda, Sierra Leone, South  
Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia are planning or considering new funds at the national level,  
while subnational jurisdictions in many other countries, including Canada and Indonesia,  
are considering them at the provincial, state or district levels.
6 Economist Intelligence Unit.
7 EITI reports.
8  National oil companies often sell oil on behalf of the state and retain a portion of oil revenues to cover their costs and for reinvestment 
purposes, following a formula (e.g., KOC in Kuwait) or on an ad hoc basis (e.g., Sonatrach in Algeria). Some other national oil companies 
function as commercial entities, paying the same tax rates as private companies (e.g., Statoil in Norway). In still others, oil revenues are 
pooled in a natural resource fund and transferred to the national oil company directly by the fund (e.g., Ghana). 
9  Natural resource funds are a type of sovereign wealth fund. The difference between a sovereign wealth fund and a natural resource fund 
is that the latter is principally financed through oil, gas and mineral sales while the former may be financed through fiscal surpluses (e.g., 
from trade surpluses) or pension contributions.
10  This definition draws on a number of sources, namely the International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG), consisting of 24 
member governments which define sovereign wealth funds as “special purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by the general 
government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve 
financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies which include investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are commonly 
established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/
or receipts resulting from commodity exports” (IWG 2007). Edwin Truman (2010) defines sovereign wealth funds as “large pools of govern-
ment-owned funds that are invested in whole or in part outside their home country.” Truman includes subnational funds. Similarly, Castelli 
and Scacciavillani (2012) define them as “publicly owned investment vehicles with a mandate to transfer wealth to future generations by 
investing in an international portfolio of securities and assets, including companies.” They specifically exclude investment vehicles primar-
ily geared toward domestic development, such as state-owned enterprises or national development banks and entities financed primarily 
through transfers of central bank reserves. We have omitted funds created to shield national budgets from agriculture-based commodity 
cycles, such as the National Coffee Fund of Colombia, a stabilization fund that was created in 1940, because the macroeconomic impacts 
of agricultural revenues are usually small relative to oil, gas and mineral revenues, and they are renewable resource revenues, whose 
optimal saving-spending ratios are different from non-renewable resource revenues.
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Government Fund name Year  
established
Value of assets 
(2013, latest 




Abu Dhabi (UAE) Abu Dhabi Investment Authority* 1976 $627 billion Petroleum
International Petroleum  
Investment Authority
1984 $65.2 billion Petroleum
Mubadala Development Company 2002 $55.5 billion Petroleum
Alabama (USA) Alabama Trust Fund*† 1985 $2.94 billion Petroleum
Alaska (USA) Alaska Permanent Fund*† 1976 $48.6 billion Petroleum
Alberta (Canada) Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund*† 1976 $15.7 billion Petroleum
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 2000 $77.2 billion Petroleum
Angola Angola Sovereign Fund 2012 $5 billion Petroleum
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund*† 1999 $35.8 billion Petroleum
Bahrain Future Generations Reserve Fund 2006 $0.2 billion Petroleum
Botswana Pula Fund*† 1994 $4.6 billion Minerals
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 1983 $40 billion Petroleum
Chile Pension Reserve Fund*† 2006 $7.3 billion Minerals
Social and Economic  
Stabilization Fund*†
2007 $15.6 billion Minerals
Colombia Savings and Stabilization Fund 2011 Not yet  
operational
Petroleum
Equatorial Guinea Fund for Future Generations 2002 $0.2 billion Petroleum
Dubai (UAE) Investment Corporation of Dubai 2006 $70 billion Petroleum
Gabon Gabon Sovereign Wealth Fund 1998 $0.4 billion Petroleum
Ghana Ghana Heritage Fund*† 2011 $0.1 billion Petroleum
Ghana Stabilization Fund*† 2011 $0.2 billion Petroleum
Iran National Development Fund of Iran* 2011 $54 billion Petroleum
Oil Stabilization Fund* 2000 No information 
available
Petroleum
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund*† 2000 $68.7 billion Petroleum
Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 1956 $0.6 billion Minerals
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority* 1953 $386 billion Petroleum
Libya Libyan Investment Authority 2006 $65 billion Petroleum
Louisiana (USA) Louisiana Education Quality  
Trust Fund†
1986 $1.2 billion Petroleum
Malaysia National Trust Fund 1988 $1.7 billion Petroleum
Mauritania National Fund for  
Hydrocarbon Reserves†
2006 $0.3 billion Petroleum
Mexico Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund 2000 $6 billion Petroleum
Mongolia Fiscal Stability Fund† 2011 $0.3 billion Minerals
Montana (USA) Montana Permanent Coal Trust Fund† 1978 $0.6 billion Minerals
Nauru Phosphate Royalties Stabilization Fund 1968 No information 
available
Minerals
11  Estimates are from primary sources, such as fund annual reports, using the latest year, where available. Otherwise we used secondary 
sources such as newspaper reports or the latest estimates from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute.
Table 1: 
List of all identified  
natural resource funds  
(as of December 2013)
Government Fund name Year  
established
Value of assets 
(2013, latest 




New Mexico (USA) Land Grant Permanent Fund† 1898 $0.9 billion Minerals 
and land
Severance Tax Permanent Fund† 1973 $0.3 billion Petroleum 
and  
minerals
Nigeria Nigerian Sovereign  
Investment Authority
2011 $1 billion Petroleum
North Dakota (USA) North Dakota Legacy Fund*† 2011 $1.2 billion Petroleum
Norway Government Pension Fund Global*† 1990 $767 billion Petroleum
Northwest Territories 
(Canada)
Northwest Territories Heritage Fund 2012 $0.001 billion Minerals
Oman State General Reserve Fund 1980 $8.2 billion Petroleum
Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea Sovereign  
Wealth Fund
2011 Not yet  
operational
Gas
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 2005 $115 billion Petroleum
Ras Al Khaimah (UAE) RAK Investment Authority 2005 $1.2 billion Petroleum
Russia National Welfare Fund*† 2004 $88.1 billion Petroleum
Reserve Fund*† 2004 $86.9 billion Petroleum
Sao Tome and Principe National Oil Account 2004 No information 
available
Petroleum
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings 1952 $675.9 billion Petroleum
Public Investment Fund 1971 $5.3 billion Petroleum
Texas (USA) Texas Permanent University Fund*† 1876 $14.4 billion Petroleum 
and land
Timor-Leste Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund*† 2005 $14.6 billion Petroleum
Trinidad and Tobago Heritage and Stabilization Fund*† 2000 $4.8 billion Petroleum
Wyoming (USA) Permanent Wyoming Mineral  
Trust Fund*†
1974 $6.1 billion Minerals
Venezuela Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund 1998 $0.8 billion Petroleum
National Development Fund† 2005 $18 billion Petroleum
* Funds profiled in the natural resource fund study
† Funds that publish quarterly reports (non-operational funds excluded) – an indicator of transparency
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Northwest Territories Heritage Fund (Canada)
Ghana Heritage Fund
Bahrain - Future Generations Reserve Fund
Equitorial Guinea - Fund for Future Generations
Ghana Stabilization Fund
Mauritania - National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves
Mongolia - Fiscal Stability Fund 
New Mexico (USA) - Severance Tax Permanent Fund
Gabon Sovereign Wealth Fund
Montana Permanent Coal Trust Fund (USA)
Kiribati - Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund
Venezuela - Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund
New Mexico (USA) - Land Grant Permanent Fund
Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority
Louisiana Education Quality Trust Fund (USA)
North Dakota Legacy Fund (USA)
Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority (UAE)
Malaysia - National Trust Fund
Alabama Trust Fund (USA)
Botswana - Pula Fund
Trinidad and Tobago - Heritage and Stabilization Fund
Angola Sovereign Fund
Saudi Arabia - Public Investment Fund
Mexico - Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund
Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund (USA)
Chile - Pension Reserve Fund
Oman - State General Reserve Fund
Texas Permanent University Fund
Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund
Chile - Social and Economic Stabilization Fund
Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (Canada)
Venezuela - National Development Fund
Azerbaijan - State Oil Fund
Brunei Investment Agency
Alaska Permanent Fund (USA)
Iran - National Development Fund
Abu Dhabi (UAE) - Mubadala Development Company
Libyan Investment Authority
Abu Dhabi (UAE) - International Petroleum Investment Authority
Kazakhstan National Fund
Dubai (UAE) - Investment Corporation of Dubai
Algeria - Revenue Regulation Fund
Russia - Reserve Fund
Russia - National Welfare Fund
Qatar Investment Authority
Kuwait Investment Authority
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (UAE)
Saudi Arabia - SAMA Foreign Holdings
Norway - Government Pension Fund Global
Figure 1: 
List of all identified natural resource funds  
(as of December 2013)
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Figure 2: 
Breakdown of the 54  
identified natural resource 
funds by assets under  
management (number  
of funds), U.S. dollars
Figure 3: 
Breakdown of the 54  
identified natural resource 
funds by principal source of 
financing (number of funds)
























Box 1: The difference between natural resource funds and other extrabudgetary funds
Governments often exclude some revenues, expenditures or financing from their annual budget 
laws, instead using separate banking or institutional arrangements called extrabudgetary funds 
to finance particular items. The most common extrabudgetary fund is a pension fund, such as the 
Canada Pension Plan. Other types include development funds that earmark spending for specific 
purposes like roads or environmental protection (e.g., Alabama (USA)’s Forever Wild Land Trust 
Fund); donor funds that manage donor aid under special conditions (e.g., Liberia Health Sector 
Pooled Fund); and multi-year budgets that do not expire at the end of the fiscal year (e.g., Timor-
Leste’s Infrastructure and Human Capacity Development Funds). 
These funds are established for many different reasons. On the one hand, they can address a need 
for guaranteed multi-year financing, save government revenues for future generations, earmark 
spending for projects that promote development rather than recurrent expenditures, or protect 
politically sensitive programs from budget cuts. On the other hand, they can be used to circumvent 
parliamentary or citizen oversight, skirt established procurement procedures or keep certain  
activities of the government secret.
Natural resource funds are a type of extrabudgetary fund. What differentiates them from other types 
of government funds is that their principal source of financing is oil, gas or minerals, and they invest 
a portion of their funds in foreign assets with the goal of making a positive financial return. Also, 
their overall objective is generally to address macroeconomic challenges, such as Dutch disease or 
expenditure volatility. 
While in most cases it is easy to distinguish between a natural resource fund and a multi-year  
financing, donor or development fund, at times the lines between them may be blurred. For  
example, the National Development Fund of Iran’s main objective is to finance the domestic private 
sector, making it more of a development bank than a natural resource fund. However, because it has 
absorbed the Oil Stabilization Fund’s foreign assets, along with its mandate to save oil revenues for 
future generations (in response to international sanctions), we have designated it a natural resource 
fund for the purposes of this project. 
  Sources: Allen, Richard and Dimitar Radev, Extrabudgetary Funds. IMF: Washington, D.C. (2010).  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/tnm/2010/tnm1009.pdf. 
  Coppin, Erin, Marcus Manuel, and Alastair McKechnie, Fragile states: measuring what makes a good pooled fund.  
ODI Project Briefing No. 58 (2011). http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7266.pdf.
Why are natural resource funds established?
There are several strong rationales for establishing a natural resource fund. First, natural resource 
funds can help smooth expenditures in ways that improve public spending efficiency and the 
government’s ability to spend thoughtfully. Since oil, gas and mineral revenues are volatile and 
unpredictable, governments may find themselves unable to set realistic budgets over the medi-
um-to-long term. Worse, they may overspend when revenues are high, perhaps on extravagant 
legacy projects (e.g., hotels, concert halls, new airports) and have to either cut essential services or 
indebt themselves when revenues decline. This can lead to poor public investments and unfin-
ished infrastructure. Governments can save a portion of revenues in stabilization funds when 
revenues are high and draw down on these funds when revenues decline in order to prevent these 
“boom-bust” spending cycles. For example, resource-rich U.S. states like Wyoming are able to 
grow through periods of temporary oil and mineral price declines due in part to the availability  
of a pool of funds to draw on during downturns.
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Policy Overview Second, funds can help governments save resource revenues when they either do not have the 
capacity to spend all the money efficiently when it comes in, or do not have significant immediate 
spending needs. Some governments, like in Timor-Leste, may find it difficult to spend all resource 
revenues as they are collected without generating significant waste because they do not possess 
the managerial systems, technology, labor or skills to spend vast sums effectively (also described 
as lack of “absorptive capacity”). In such cases, governments may elect to ‘park’ some revenues 
now in foreign assets until they develop enough capacity to spend the money well or the economy 
grows enough to absorb these revenues.12 
However, even in advanced economies, saving revenues from a non-renewable resource may gen-
erate longer-lasting benefits than spending it all in the short-term. Oil, gas and minerals are finite 
assets. As such, some governments have recognized that saving a portion of extractive revenues, 
investing them in productive assets and living off the investment returns can extend the financial 
benefits of extraction beyond the life of the oil field or mine, perhaps even indefinitely. Addition-
ally, there is an ethical case to be made about intergenerational equity; some believe that our 
children should receive the same share of financial benefits as the current generation. With small 
populations and vast oil wealth, many Persian Gulf countries like Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the 
UAE have chosen to save for these reasons. In each, saving oil wealth has created an endowment 
for the benefit of future generations. 
Third, funds can help mitigate Dutch disease by sterilizing large capital inflows, in this case 
foreign exchange inflows associated with oil, gas or mineral sales. Countries or regions with 
relatively small economies that scale up oil, gas or mineral production quickly may find that, if 
the economy cannot absorb it effectively, the large inflow of foreign currency associated with pro-
duction can lead to the exchange rate appreciating or prices and wages increasing. This can cause 
local businesses to become less competitive internationally and harm the non-resource economy. 
Governments can help mitigate this so-called Dutch disease by saving a portion of resource 
revenues in foreign assets. This is called fiscal sterilization. Countries such as Norway and Saudi 
Arabia have kept their exchange rates under control or inflation lower than it would have been 
otherwise by saving resource revenues in foreign assets rather than spending them domestically.
Fourth, a natural resource fund can be a means of limiting the discretion of politicians in making 
spending decisions and earmarking revenues for public investments like roads, water systems, 
hospital equipment and education programs. Earmarking involves withdrawing money from a 
natural resource fund and requiring that it be spent on specific expenditure items through the 
budget process or as cash transfers to households. Importantly, it does not refer to making public 
spending decisions through the fund’s choices of asset holdings, bypassing the formal budget 
process. This could damage the integrity of the public financial management system, possibly 
circumventing accountability mechanisms like parliamentary oversight and audits, and lead to 
the use of resource revenues for patronage. 
Examples of earmarking include Ghana’s rule that oil revenues must fund “development-related 
expenditures” and Alabama’s (USA) earmarking of some oil and gas revenues for land conserva-
tion, municipal capital expenditures and senior services. In Alaska (USA), a portion of oil revenues 
are distributed directly to residents. Since governments that already spend considerable amounts 
on public investment projects may simply shift money around to make it seem like they are using 
natural resource revenues to finance these projects, earmarking may be most useful where there 
exists strong political pressure to overspend on recurrent expenditures such as public wages and
12  In low-income, capital-scarce economies such as that of Timor-Leste, spending needs are immediate, so fiscal space must be provided to 
allow the government to build the “absorptive capacity” to transform resource revenues into long-lasting assets such as infrastructure and 
human resources.
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fuel subsidies. Earmarking has the added benefit of drawing public attention to the exhaustible  
nature of oil, gas and mineral resources by stressing that the revenues derived from their produc-
tion must be invested rather than consumed; otherwise, they will have little lasting benefit. 
Fifth, some funds have been created to “ring-fence” resource revenues to protect them from  
corruption or mismanagement. Given their size and the complex nature of revenue streams  
(e.g., royalties, profit taxes, bonuses, license fees) entering government coffers from extractive 
companies, natural resource revenues are often a target of misappropriation. Separating resource 
revenues can help reduce the risk of corruption and mismanagement only where there are strict 
and comprehensive disclosure requirements for fund operations and where there is a formal 
and effective oversight mechanism to monitor these operations. For example, the Sao Tome and 
Principe National Oil Account is subject to rigorous transparency provisions that ensure that oil 
revenues are well accounted for, and fund operations are open to public scrutiny. Governments 
may also want to ring-fence resource revenues because oil, gas and minerals are non-renewable. 
Pooling revenues under the management of a single authority can help governments distinguish 
and isolate these finite revenues from other government revenues so that they can be treated  
differently (i.e., saved). 
Finally, natural resource funds can provide governments with greater political leverage, power 
and autonomy. Legislators in the Northwest Territories in Canada, for instance, have stated that 
their newly established Heritage Fund, financed by mineral revenues, will give the territorial 
government greater political autonomy from the Canadian federal government. And in low- and 
middle-income countries, governments can draw upon precautionary savings in cases of finan-
cial crisis instead of borrowing from private banks or international financial institutions, both of 
which can impose burdens on a government. In short, natural resource funds can be a powerful 
source of protection against foreign influence and market forces. 
That said, natural resource funds are not always established with the public or national interest 
in mind. In some countries, particularly but not exclusively those ruled by authoritarian regimes, 
natural resource funds have been established to avoid public scrutiny of specific projects or by-
pass formal oversight. As such, many have been used as slush funds by the ruling family or party. 
The Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) under the Gadhafi regime is a case in point, where the late 
dictator’s son, Saif al-Islam Gadhafi, had nearly full discretion to manage much of the fund’s ap-
proximately $65 billion. Billions of dollars were invested with Gadhafi’s close acquaintances.13 
Finally, one of the most common reasons for establishing a natural resource fund has been  
to make a global statement about self-determination. Natural resource funds have become  
symbols of development and progress and are not always promoted as solutions to specific  
macroeconomic or budgetary problems. As such, they sometimes represent form over substance 
and are created without a well-defined objective in mind. This lack of clarity presents a real  
danger, as poorly conceived funds can undermine public financial management systems and  
can lead to squandering of revenues. 
13  Lina Saigol and Cynthia O’Murchu, “After Gadhafi: A Spent Force,” The Financial Times, September 8, 2011.  
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1b5e11b6-d4cb-11e0-a7ac-00144feab49a.html#axzz2PclPUcQK.
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Policy Overview Box 2: A brief history of natural resource funds
Natural resource funds are not new. The oldest continually operating fund, the Texas Permanent 
University Fund (USA), dates back to 1876. The Kuwait Investment Board, the Kuwait Investment 
Authority’s predecessor, was the first fund established at the national level in 1953, albeit while 
Kuwait was a British protectorate. However, it is only since the 2000s that natural resource fund 
growth has accelerated significantly. Their proliferation has been driven in part by historical con-
text—a desire to learn from the mistakes of the 1970s-80s, when oil and gas windfalls were largely 
consumed without leaving many long-term benefits—but also by an emerging academic consensus 
on the optimal management of natural resource revenues windfalls, new large discoveries in several 
countries, and historically high oil and mineral prices in the 21st century, hence unexpectedly high 
government revenues. 
In response to fears from recipient countries that sovereign wealth fund investments could be  
politically motivated, in 2007 the G7 called on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to develop  
international standards for fund governance and transparency, which became known as the  
Santiago Principles. An International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) consisting  
of fund officials was established in 2009 to encourage compliance with these principles.  
Implementation to date has been slow.
When the term “sovereign wealth fund” was coined by Andrew Romanov in 2005 (the earliest  
known use of the term “natural resource fund” comes from a 2007 publication by Macartan 
Humphreys and Martin E. Sandbu, though several IMF staffers referred to “nonrenewable resource 
funds” in the early 2000s), natural resource funds held approximately $1 trillion in assets. Just nine 
years later, they hold approximately $3.5 trillion in assets.
Are natural resource funds meeting their policy objectives?
Natural resource funds have had varied success in achieving their policy objectives. In Chile, the 
Economic and Social Stabilization Fund has helped the government stabilize the budget despite 
large and unexpected rises and falls in government revenues, mainly caused by copper price vola-
tility (see Figure 3). The Norwegian and Saudi Arabian funds have protected their economies from 
oil price shocks and sterilized capital inflows, helping to mitigate Dutch disease effects. In Timor-
Leste, accumulation of oil revenues in the Petroleum Fund has helped the government smooth 
spending over the longer term. By keeping enormous capital inflows from overwhelming the 
economy, it has curbed wasteful public spending and has also helped to mitigate Dutch disease 
effects. Finally, funds in many countries and subnational jurisdictions, such as those in Ghana, 
Kazakhstan, Kuwait and North Dakota (USA), are saving revenues from non-renewable resources 
so that future generations may benefit from today’s exploration, development and production. 
However, many funds have served to undermine public financial management systems. In 
Azerbaijan, for example, billions of dollars’ worth of strategic government projects are financed 
directly out of the State Oil Fund (SOFAZ), including a railway between Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Turkey. These expenditure items are not subject to the same reporting or public procurement 
requirements as those financed out of the normal budget process. 
Funds have also been used for patronage and nepotism. For example, the Libyan and Kuwaiti 
funds have incurred billions of dollars in avoidable losses due to financial transactions that 
benefited friends of the regime or investment managers. And in Nigeria, billions of dollars were 
withdrawn from the Excess Crude Account without plan or justification.14 
14  See Rules-based Investment for Natural Resource Funds for references to the Libyan and Kuwaiti cases; M.U. Ndagi,  
“Nigeria: Devouring Excess Crude Account,” Daily Trust, September 7, 2013. http://allafrica.com/stories/201309090256.html. 
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Fund operations are often opaque and not subject to independent oversight. The Algerian,  
Bruneian, Omani and Turkmenistani funds are some of the most extreme examples of weak 
transparency; a visit to the Brunei Investment Agency website provides business hours, an email 
address and not much else. However, even some governments, such as Equatorial Guinea, Iran, 
Kuwait and Qatar, that are signatories to the Santiago Principles which commit them to a basic 
standard of disclosure vis-à-vis their funds, fail to publish detailed information on investments 
or activities. This opacity and a lack of independent oversight raise questions around how these 
funds are being used and whom they are benefiting.
In many cases, funds have simply been ineffective. As Figure 4 illustrates, while funds in Norway, 
Chile and Saudi Arabia have helped smooth government spending despite having to deal with 
volatile oil revenues, self-declared stabilization funds in Kazakhstan, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Venezuela have failed to stabilize the budget. And some savings funds have failed to save as  
their mandate requires. For example, one of the objectives of the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust 
Fund in Canada is to save oil revenues for future generations. Yet despite sky-high production and 
historically high prices at times from 1987 to 2013, only two relatively small deposits were made 
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Policy Overview Key findings and recommendations
Given the size of revenues managed by these funds in the more than 40 countries that operate 
them—often in the many billions of dollars—and the dangers that weak governance can pose, 
good natural resource fund governance is essential for transforming natural resource wealth into 
citizen well-being. The proliferation of funds, especially in lower-income countries and low-
capacity environments, will make good governance even more important in the coming years. But 
what constitutes good natural resource fund governance? And what can policymakers, oversight 
bodies and the international community do to improve natural resource fund governance?
The following are our findings from the study of 18 natural resource funds; secondary sources 
and in-country interviews; and discussions with policymakers and civil society in resource-rich 
countries (see Annex 2 for secondary sources and publications).
What is good natural resource fund governance?
Our survey of natural resource funds found several key elements of good fund governance:  
setting a single or multiple fund objectives; establishing appropriate fiscal rules; setting clear  
investment constraints; creating an effective institutional governance structure; making  
extensive information on fund operations public; and establishing strong independent oversight 
over these operations. These elements are reflected throughout the natural resource fund profiles 
and summarized in page 4 of each profile (see Annex 1 for an explanation of page 4 [“Good Gover-
nance Standards” page of the profile]). Below is a detailed summary of each of these elements.
Setting a single or multiple objectives
The objectives of natural resource funds should be clearly stated in government policy, regulation, 
legislation or even in the constitution. They could include:
 • Saving for future generations
 • Stabilizing expenditures as a response to oil, gas or mineral revenue volatility 
 • Sterilizing capital inflows
 • Earmarking resource revenues for specific expenditures 
 • Protecting resource revenues from mismanagement, corruption or patronage
 • Saving in case of environmental, financial or social crisis
Some funds serve a single objective, while others serve multiple objectives. For instance, in 
Ghana there are three funds. The Petroleum Holding Fund ring-fences all oil revenues and the law 
requires that the government use resource revenues withdrawn from the fund for development-
related projects. The Ghana Heritage Fund saves revenues for the benefit of future generations. 
The Ghana Stabilization Fund helps to mitigate budget volatility. In contrast, the Timor-Leste 
Petroleum Fund serves as an all-in-one savings, stabilization, sterilization and ring-fencing fund.
At the same time, some resource funds are established without a well-defined objective, making 
it difficult for policymakers to decide on operational rules or manage the fund’s investments. For 
example, Azerbaijan’s State Oil Fund’s three objectives are to accumulate and preserve revenues 
for future generations, finance major government projects, and “preserve macroeconomic  
stability by decreasing dependence on oil revenues and stimulate the development of the non-
oil sector.” Terms such as “preserve macroeconomic stability” are undefined. Furthermore, it is 
unclear what proportion of the fund is designated for each objective and what operational rules, 
if any, help the fund achieve them. Multiple objectives in and of themselves are not necessarily 
problematic, but the lack of operational rules to help funds meet those objectives and lack of  
clarity around objectives are.
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Which objective or set of objectives a government chooses should be informed by the challenges 
the economy will face. For instance, if the government can absorb a large inflow of oil revenue 
and spend it efficiently but the inflow is so large that it will generate significant year-to-year 
budget volatility, a government may wish to establish a stabilization fund. However, if revenues 
will overwhelm the economy over the longer term, for example, by generating Dutch disease, it 
may be worthwhile to set up a fiscal sterilization fund. Where none of the problems associated 
with resource revenue inflows are expected to emerge—for instance, where resource revenues are 
small and where public financial management, transparency and oversight are effective enough 
that they will generate substantial benefits and economic growth—it may be preferable not to set 
up a fund at all. 
Good practices: Funds in Chile, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Trinidad and Tobago each have 
strong statements on objectives that make their purpose clear (though this does not mean that 
they achieve these objectives).
Establishing fiscal rules  
(see “Fiscal Rules for Natural Resource Funds” policy brief)
Fiscal rules—multi-year numerical constraints on government finances—are perhaps the most 
important rules governing fund behavior. Whether a natural resource fund meets its objective(s) 
depends almost wholly on the suitability, clarity and enforcement of its fiscal rules. First, rules 
act as a commitment mechanism, binding successive governments to a long-term vision of 
public finances, so important in regions reliant on finite and unstable revenues. Second, they can 
facilitate the implementation of budgetary goals and hence improve the efficiency of the public 
financial management system. Third, they define the conditions under which deposits and with-
drawals are made, which can stabilize government spending or generate savings.
Fiscal rules are operationalized through deposit and withdrawal rules. These rules should be 
clarified in legislation, regulation or a binding policy document. Exceptions to these rules—for 
example, in cases of environmental, financial or social crisis—should also be clarified. 
The absence of clearly defined fiscal rules presents significant risks. In Azerbaijan, for instance, 
the lack of a withdrawal rule has led to discretionary withdrawals that have enabled the govern-
ment to spend lavishly when oil prices are high and to cuts when oil prices have declined. The 
Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (Canada) was established as a savings fund in 1976, though 
deposits were halted in 1987. As a result of this lack of a deposit rule, the fund saved less than  
$4 billion in oil revenues over 25 years, despite hundreds of billions of dollars in oil revenues 
entering government coffers over the same period. In 2013, the Alberta government finally  
instituted a set of fiscal rules with long-term savings and fiscal stabilization objectives in mind. 
No single rule is appropriate for every country; context should determine the design of fiscal 
rules and there must be political consensus on their suitability, or they may not be enforced. For 
example, in Timor-Leste, spending has exceeded what the fiscal rule calls for in nearly every year 
since 2010, partly a consequence of an overly constraining rule for a country desperately in need 
of domestic public investment. That said, strong internal controls and independent oversight can 
help enforce rules.15 
Good practices: The parliaments of Chile, Ghana, and Trinidad and Tobago have established clear 
and appropriate fiscal rules for their countries (though both the governments of Ghana and Trini-
dad and Tobago tend to fiddle with their revenue projections in order to spend more and save less).
15  See policy briefs on Institutional Structure of Natural Resource Funds and Independent Oversight of Natural Resource Funds for how to 
enforce the rules.




Establishing investment rules  
(see “Rules-based Investment for Natural Resource Funds” policy brief)
Money deposited into a fund must be placed somewhere. One difference between natural resource 
funds and the government’s consolidated/general fund is that some or the entire natural resource 
fund is invested in financial or other assets abroad.16 Investments may include stocks, bonds, 
derivatives, real estate or even infrastructure. 
Investments can be riskier, with an expected higher long-term financial return, or less risky. A 
fund’s investment risk profile should be a function of its policy objectives (e.g., stabilization 
fund assets should be more liquid than savings fund assets), the strength of the systems set up to 
prevent mismanagement, and the capacity to manage complex investments (or at least the capac-
ity to manage the managers). No matter what risk profile is chosen, it should be well defined and 
enforced through explicit rules that limit exposure. For example, legislation, regulation or fund 
policy can detail the allocation between cash, fixed income investments, equities and alternative 
assets. Each can also prohibit investments in certain high-risk financial instruments or volatile 
currencies. Also, specific assets owned by the fund (e.g., real estate, Berkshire Fund stocks) should 
be listed in a publicly available document in order to generate a disincentive to invest in obscure 
or high-risk investments (the Alaska Permanent Fund [USA] is a model in this regard). Lack of 
rules around investment risk in an opaque setting can generate substantial losses for a fund. For 
example, the Kuwait Investment Authority lost approximately $5 billion from poor investments 
in Spanish companies in the early 1990s due to a combination of lack of oversight and lack of 
investment rules.17
Investments can be made in either foreign or domestic assets. Although the governments of many 
resource-rich developing countries invest in domestic projects directly from natural resource 
funds, a better practice is to make these investments from the budget itself for at least two rea-
sons. First, domestic spending through the fund can undermine rules designed for fiscal steriliza-
tion.18 But more importantly, such spending might undermine transparency and accountability 
systems. Bypassing the normal budget process could circumvent controls and safeguards such as 
project appraisal, public tendering and project monitoring, and enable patronage or financing for 
projects that support the political goals of government officials or fund managers. To avoid these 
outcomes, many funds—including those in Abu Dhabi (UAE), Botswana, Chile, Ghana, Kazakhstan 
and Norway—prohibit direct domestic investments. 
Another common investment rule is to prohibit the use of some or all of fund assets as collateral. 
A multi-billion-dollar natural resource fund can be used to secure government loans. In brief, 
the government can promise creditors that if it defaults on its debt, the fund’s assets can be used 
to pay them back. This is particularly useful for credit-constrained governments, those that are 
charged high interest rates, or those that have been locked out of international financial markets 
because of weak government finances. However, this strategy also puts natural resource revenues 
at risk—especially if the government has a tendency to default—and encourages over-borrowing. 
For example, from 2000 to 2004 Angola borrowed more than $9 billion, all backed by oil revenues, 
from banks like Société Générale, China Eximbank, Barclays Bank and Royal Bank of Scotland.19 At 
the same time, the Angolan government was negotiating with the IMF to restructure its debt due 
to heavy debt-servicing commitments. One solution to this problem has been to restrict either 
16  The consolidated fund or general fund is the government’s main bank account, usually held at the central bank. Also, it is important to 
differentiate between funds and official reserves. While natural resource funds (along with the consolidated or general fund) belong to the 
government, official reserves belong to the central bank. Keeping these accounts separate helps prevent confusing fiscal and monetary 
policy operations.
17  Bazoobandi, Sara, Political Economy of the Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Case Study of Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab  
Emirates. New York: Routledge (2012).  
18  If one of the objectives of the fund is to mitigate Dutch disease, it may enact a fiscal rule that requires that a certain portion of resource 
revenues must be invested in foreign assets. However, reinvesting these revenues inside the country would undermine this objective.
19 Brautigam, Deborah, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009).
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Policy Overview part of all of a natural resource fund from being used as collateral. While this may not prevent 
over-borrowing—since international lenders might assume that in a crisis the fund would be used 
to bail out the government even though the fund assets are not formally pledged—it is important 
to make these rules explicit.
Good practices: Alberta (Canada), Chile, Norway and Timor-Leste have codified comprehensive 
investment rules that limit the risks fund managers can take and, in Norway’s case, impose ethical 
investment guidelines on fund investments.
Clarifying division of responsibilities and enforcing ethical and conflict of interest standards  
(see “Institutional Structure of Natural Resource Funds” policy brief)
Fiscal rules and investment rules must be implemented by government officials and fund  
managers. A clear division of responsibilities, strong internal controls and political indepen-
dence, and strong internal capacity are essential for correct implementation. 
Organizational structure is very context-specific. However, the roles and responsibilities of  
governing bodies—such as the legislature, executive, central bank, advisory bodies, fund  
governing board and fund executive—should be detailed in law, regulation or a government  
policy document. The same is true for the internal structure of the operational manager,  
whether it’s a unit within the central bank, a unit in the ministry of finance, or a separate entity. 
Chile, for example, has regulation that designates the Minister of Finance as both the manager 
and ultimate authority over the two funds and the Central Bank of Chile as the day-to-day  
operational manager of fund investments. In Norway, the manager and operational manager  
are also the Minister of Finance and central bank, respectively, but the fund is ultimately  
accountable to the Storting (parliament).
The fund’s governing structure must be made clear and governing bodies must enforce ethical and 
conflict of interest standards, preferably through concrete penalties such as dismissal, fines or 
even imprisonment. Staffing policies should encourage professionalism and compliance with  
operational rules. These measures should be complemented by transparency, independent  
oversight and political will to follow the rules. 
Authoritarian regimes often lack these checks and balances that prevent mismanagement. In such 
settings, large pools of funds can become tempting targets. The Russian government, for instance, 
arbitrarily suspended its fiscal rules in 2010 and has since nearly emptied the Reserve Fund  
(valued at approximately $150 billion in 2009) and raided the National Wealth Fund of tens of  
billions of dollars, which had been intended to finance future Russian pension liabilities.20 In such 
an environment, political will is an essential element of good resource revenue management. 
Good practices: Norway and Texas (USA) each have strong internal controls that include regular 
and publicly available internal audits, ethical guidelines for fund employees, effective monitoring 
of external managers, and independent oversight at every level, including over the board of  
directors, managers and staff. 
Requiring regular and extensive disclosures and audits  
(see “Natural Resource Fund Transparency” policy brief)
Good fund governance requires a strong degree of transparency for several reasons. First,  
transparency can encourage compliance with fiscal rules and investment rules by aligning  
public expectations with government objectives. Second, transparency can improve government 
20  Kryukov, Valery et al., “The contest for control: oil and gas management in Russia,” Plundered Nations?: Successes and Failures in Natural 
Resource Extraction (eds. Paul Collier and Anthony J. Venables), New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2011). 
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efficiency, since ministries, parliaments and regulatory agencies benefit from improvements 
in data quality. Third, transparency is a prerequisite for accountability and compliance with 
governance rules, because oversight bodies cannot monitor fund operations and scrutinize fund 
performance without adequate information.
Transparency means not only publishing regular, accurate and data-disaggregated reports on fund 
activities in a format that is fully accessible to lay readers but also making the rules governing 
the fund clear and public. One way of institutionalizing transparency is by requiring the public 
release of all regulations, policy documents, quarterly financial statements and annual internal 
and independent external audits, and requiring that these meet international standards. Reports 
should not only be backward-looking; they should also clarify what will be achieved in the future 
to set benchmarks for performance and set public expectations.
Good practices: Funds in Alaska (USA), Chile, Norway, Texas (USA) and Timor-Leste can be  
considered models of transparency. Each discloses deposit and withdrawal amounts, specific 
investments (including type, location, currency composition and returns), significant fund  
activities and transactions, and fund managers.
Establishing strong independent oversight bodies to monitor fund behavior  
(see “Independent Oversight of Natural Resource Funds” policy brief)
Effective internal control mechanisms are often not enough to ensure compliance with  
governance rules or management of natural resource funds in the public interest. Independent 
oversight bodies should also funds in order to exert external pressure on policymakers and fund 
managers. They should be politically accountable to the legislature; operationally accountable  
to the comptroller, auditor-general or other independent formal supervisory body; legally  
accountable to the judiciary; and scrutinized by civil society, the press and even international 
bodies like the IMF or policy institutes.
Governments sometimes circumvent their own rules due to weaknesses in independent oversight 
and lack of transparency. For instance, Abu Dhabi (UAE) has three natural resource funds, none 
of which require parliamentary approval for withdrawals. In addition, despite self-made claims 
of political independence, leading members of the ruling family sit on the Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority’s board of directors. This conflict of interest and lack of oversight, combined with a lack 
of transparency, has resulted in questions raised around the potential for politically motivated 
investments and misuse of funds. In Ghana, the Public Interest and Accountability Committee 
(PIAC), a body charged with monitoring compliance with oil revenue management legislation, 
has not been given an operating budget by the government, nor does it have formal powers to en-
force its recommendations. Taking advantage of these weaknesses in independent oversight, the 
government has overestimated oil revenue projections in order to artificially inflate its spending 
allowances as fixed by Ghana’s fiscal rule.21 
Independent oversight bodies can encourage good financial management by praising compliance 
with the rules and good fund governance. In some cases, they can also discourage poor behavior 
by imposing punitive measures ranging from naming-and-shaming to fines, imprisonment or 
international sanctions. For example, Alberta (Canada) requires that its legislature conduct an-
nual reviews of fund performance, ensuring compliance with regulations, and that it hold annual 
public meetings on fund activities. This is on top of periodic reviews of investment methodology
21  PIAC Report on Management of Petroleum Revenues for Year 2012.  
http://piacghana.org/. See Ghana’s natural resource fund profile for further information. 
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Policy Overview and regular external audits that are publicly available.22 And in 2008, the Timor-Leste appeals 
court found that a $290.7 million withdrawal from the Petroleum Fund was illegal.23
While there are numerous types of oversight mechanisms, independent oversight is most effec-
tive when the oversight body has expertise in the topic under investigation, possesses the power 
or capacity to investigate, has access to information, holds enforcement powers, and is integrated 
with the institutional environment. If authorities decide to establish new bodies to oversee the 
natural resource fund (e.g., Ghana’s PIAC or Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund Consultative Coun-
cil), which is not always necessary, these bodies should support existing institutions such as the 
comptroller’s office or parliament by providing targeted reports on compliance with legislation or 
regulation. Where existing institutions have the potential to become more effective, they should 
be strengthened legislatively or through capacity building activities.
Good practices: Alberta (Canada), Ghana and North Dakota (USA) have introduced strong  
independent oversight requirements on their respective funds. 
What are recent trends in natural resource fund governance?
Codifying rules. There is a trend toward establishing strict deposit, withdrawal, investment and 
other governance rules in legislation or regulation. The new Mongolian Fiscal Stabilization Fund 
is a case in point, with deposits and withdrawals determined by a set of fiscal rules (an expendi-
ture growth rule, a structural balance rule and a debt ceiling). Often, new funds draw on a small 
22  World Bank Institute, Parliamentary Oversight of the Extractive Industries Sector, 2010.  
http://www.agora-parl.org/sites/default/files/parliamentary_oversight_and_the_extractive_industries.pdf. 
23  La’o Hamutuk, Timor-Leste Appeals Court Invalidates 2008 State Budget, 2008.  
http://www.laohamutuk.org/econ/MYBU08/BudgetRuledUnconstitutional08.htm. 
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number of model pieces of legislation. For example, the recently established Northwest Terri-
tories Heritage Fund drew on Alberta’s legislation, the Mongolian Fiscal Stability Fund drew on 
the Chilean experience, and Norway was used as a model in Timor-Leste. This is partly due to the 
influence of the IMF, World Bank and international consultants, particularly from Norway and 
Chile, who act as principal advisors on the establishment of new funds. However, aspects of these 
models may be inappropriate in developing- or post-conflict contexts. Specifically, fiscal rules 
that generate significant savings and limit fiscal space for domestic investments in health,  
education and infrastructure may be too constraining for governments in capital-scarce countries 
(see “Fiscal Rules for Natural Resource Funds”). Also, foreign advisors often underemphasize  
enforcement mechanisms such as transparency and oversight requirements. While some of  
the advice around fiscal rules is changing, advisors should place added stress on rules around 
disclosure and compliance. 
Greater transparency. Of the 23 natural resource funds scored by Allie Bagnall and Edwin 
Truman’s Sovereign Wealth Fund Scorecard in both 2007 and 2012, all but three became more 
transparent over time. Specifically, many more funds are publishing audits, information about 
returns and investment manager information. Two Abu Dhabi funds, Chile’s Economic and Social 
Stabilization Fund, and Trinidad and Tobago’s Heritage and Stabilization Fund improved the most 
since 2007.24 On the other hand, some funds, like Equatorial Guinea’s Fund for Future Generations 
and the Libyan Investment Authority, still keep nearly all information about their activities secret. 
In Kuwait, it is against the law to disclose information about the Investment Authority to the  
public.25 Transparency remains a serious challenge overall, with only about half of the funds  
studied releasing audits (internal or external) or publishing specific investments (see Figure 5). 
24  Bagnall, Allie and Edwin Truman, Progress on Sovereign Wealth Fund Transparency and Accountability: An Updated SWF Scoreboard.  
Peterson Institute for International Economics: Washington DC (2013). http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb13-19.pdf. 
25  2013 Resource Governance Index. Revenue Watch Institute: New York. http://www.revenuewatch.org/rgi.   
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Policy Overview Continued resistance to some rules. While funds are becoming more rules-based, operational 
and fund management rules—for instance rules for which revenues must be deposited and when 
and the rules clarifying the roles of different government agencies in fund management—are 
much more common than transparency requirements or checks on corruption and patronage  
(see Figure 6). At the same time, some governments are resistant to even the most basic opera-
tional rules. The governments of Abu Dhabi (UAE), Azerbaijan, Botswana, Kuwait, and Russia,  
for example, have been unwilling to impose withdrawal rules on their respective funds, while  
the governments of Abu Dhabi (UAE) and Botswana have not imposed deposit rules.
Governments seem most resistant to prohibiting domestic investment through choices of asset 
allocation and publishing key information such as lists of specific investments or internal and  
external audits (see Figure 7 and Annex 1 for an explanation of different rules).  Funds in  
Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Kuwait, Mexico, Russia and Qatar, for instance, remain  
relatively opaque despite their governments signing on to the Santiago Principles.26 
26  Opacity here is measured using Allie Bagnall and Edwin Truman’s 2013 Progress on Sovereign Wealth Fund Transparency and Accountability: 
An Updated SWF Scoreboard indicators 20-23. The Santiago Principles are a voluntary set of transparency principles and practices for  
sovereign wealth funds agreed upon by governments. 
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What steps should the international community, specifically the international financial  
institutions and other advisors who support governments in establishing and operating  
natural resource funds, take to improve fund governance?
First, international institutions and advisors should carefully consider the implications of  
suggesting the establishment of funds where public financial management systems are opaque 
and poorly functioning. In other words, international advisors should recognize that the estab-
lishment of a fund by itself will not improve resource governance. Rather, natural resource funds 
ought to be products of fiscal rules or macroeconomic frameworks that call for savings of oil, gas 
or mineral revenues, and minimum conditions (e.g., clear objectives, fiscal rules, investment rules, 
effective oversight and transparency) must be present if funds are to improve resource governance. 
Too often funds are established without a well-defined rationale, leading to poor outcomes.
Second, funds are often established by the executive branch of government, usually the finance 
ministry, on the advice of international experts from high-profile academic institutions or inter-
national financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank and through a technocratic process. 
This approach is doomed to fail in many countries. Unless there is political consensus on the use 
of resource revenues and informed civil society and oversight bodies to put pressure on govern-
ments to follow their own rules, even the best rules will usually not be followed. The internation-
al community can do a better job of encouraging multi-stakeholder consensus in order to agree on 
funds’ operational rules and ensure compliance with those rules. In most cases, this will involve 
broad-based consultations around oil, gas or mineral revenue management legislation.
Third, the international community can better support oversight actors like legislators, auditors, 
the media and civil society in their work to promote compliance with fund governance rules. The 
IMF and World Bank, for example, often work exclusively with ministries and government officials, 
overlooking the important role that other actors play in promoting good governance. These other 
players must be as well informed as the government for funds to become better managed. Donors 
may therefore wish to consider added financial and technical assistance to these groups. They may 
also wish to remove the IMF and World Bank’s constraints from working with oversight bodies or 
finance independent organizations to support the work of oversight institutions like parliaments, 
civil society and the media.
Fourth, the international community should promote enhanced global norms for good  
resource revenue management. Currently, there are a number of international standards for  
fund governance, notably the Santiago Principles and the IMF Guide on Resource Revenue  
Transparency. However, they do not go far enough. Both focus mainly on disclosure of informa-
tion, clarification of roles and responsibilities, and political motivation of investments. None  
of the existing standards explicitly address funds’ impacts on the citizens whose wealth they 
manage, or the issue of fiscal rules. Recently, several efforts have been made to codify fund be-
havior and create a global standard for fiscal rules. These include Edwin Truman for his Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Scoreboard; the IMF recent guidance note advocating a flexible approach on fiscal 
rules in its policy notes; the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) new standard, 
which includes information on fund management; and the Natural Resource Charter’s inclusion 
of revenue volatility and management in precepts seven and eight.27 However, there is still no 
international consensus on what good fund governance entails.
Finally, while national policy initiatives like the establishment of natural resource funds  
should be driven from within countries or regions, the international community can further  
encourage governments to better manage their resource revenues by placing natural resource 
27  Natural Resource Charter precept seven: “Resource revenues should be used primarily to promote sustained, inclusive economic  
development through enabling and maintaining high levels of investment in the country.” Precept eight: “Effective utilization of resource 
revenues requires that domestic expenditure and investment be built up gradually and be smoothed to take account of revenue volatility.”
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Policy Overview fund governance on the international agenda. Improved natural resource fund governance  
can prevent loss and mismanagement of billions of dollars that could go to health, education  
or infrastructure. It can also improve macroeconomic stability and mitigating Dutch disease,  
thereby improving the quality of investments, increasing growth rates and helping to diversify  
the economy. The indirect effects might even be much more significant than the direct ones.  
International institutions, academics and other influencers may be able to do more for poverty  
alleviation and growth by pushing for improved natural resource fund governance—such as 
encouraging codification of deposit and withdrawal rules and additional transparency—than 
through many other types of diplomatic interventions.
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Annex 1: Explanation of the good governance standards in the natural resource 
fund profiles (page 4) 
These good governance standards for natural resource funds draw on a number of sources  
including the 2013 Resource Governance Index questionnaire, Edwin Truman’s Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Scoreboard and the Santiago Principles.
Operations
Are objectives clear: The objectives of natural resource funds should be clearly stated in  
government policy, regulation, legislation or even in the constitution.
Rule for how much can be withdrawn in any given year: Fiscal rules (withdrawal and deposit) 
are the most important rules governing fund behavior. Whether a natural resource fund meets its 
objective(s) depends almost wholly on the suitability, clarity and enforcement of its fiscal rules. 
These rules should be clarified in legislation, regulation or a binding policy document.  
Rule for which revenues must be deposited and when: Same as above.
Are exceptions to rules clarified: Exceptions to fiscal rules—for example, in cases of  
environmental, financial or social crisis—should also be clarified.
Investment
Use of resource revenues as collateral: Using resource revenues to back government debt puts 
natural resource revenues at risk, especially if the government has a tendency to default, and  
encourages over-borrowing. One solution has been to restrict either part of all of a natural  
resource fund from being used as collateral. It is important to make these rules explicit. 
Domestic investment Is explicitly prohibited: Financing domestic investment directly by the 
fund is not recommended, because it can undermine transparency and accountability systems 
by bypassing the normal budget process, with its controls and safeguards, such as parliamentary 
approval, project appraisal, public tendering and project monitoring. All spending out of the fund 
should pass through the budget process and be subject to normal budgetary oversight processes.
Investment risk limitations: No matter what risk profile is chosen, it should be well defined and 
enforced through explicit rules that limit risk.
Publication of specific investments: In order to determine whether the risk limitations are  
being met, a public list of specific assets held by the fund should be published.
Management 
Penalties for misconduct: Ethical and conflict-of-interest standards must be enforced by  
the fund’s governing structure, preferably through concrete penalties such as dismissal, fines  
or even imprisonment.
Ethical and conflict of interest standards: Ethical and conflict-of-interest standards must be 
made clear in order for employees to understand the constraints they must abide by. 
Detailed responsibilities of fund managers and staff: The roles and responsibilities of the  
operational manager, whether a unit within the central bank, a unit in the ministry of finance  
or a separate entity, should be detailed in law, regulation or a government policy document.
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Policy Overview Role of government agencies in fund management: The roles and responsibilities of the govern-
ing bodies—such as the legislature, executive, central bank, advisory bodies, fund governing board 
and fund executive—should be detailed in law, regulation or a government policy document.
Transparency and Oversight
Public disclosure of external audits: This is a prerequisite for accountability and compliance 
with governance rules, because oversight bodies cannot monitor fund operations and scrutinize 
fund performance without adequate information.
Public disclosure of internal audits: This is a prerequisite for accountability and compliance 
with governance rules, because internal managers cannot monitor fund operations and scrutinize 
fund performance without adequate information.
Formalized oversight mechanisms: Effective internal control mechanisms are often not enough 
to ensure compliance with governance rules or management of natural resource funds in the  
public interest. Funds should also be monitored by independent oversight bodies that exert  
external pressure on policymakers and fund managers.
Public disclosure of regularly compiled fund reports: This is a prerequisite for accountability 
and compliance with governance rules, because oversight bodies cannot monitor fund operations 
and scrutinize fund performance without adequate information.
33
Annex 2: Relevant publications 
Bacon, Robert and Silvana Tordo, Experiences with Oil Funds: Institutional and Financial Aspects. 
World Bank: Washington (2006). http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/ 
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/01/22/000020439_20070122164239/Rendered/PDF/ 
ESM3210Experiences1Oil1Fund01PUBLIC1.pdf. 
Bagattini, Gustavo Yudi, The Political Economy of Stabilisation Funds: Measuring their Success in 
Resource-Dependent Countries. IDS Working Paper 356 (2011). http://www.ids.ac.uk/go/ 
idspublication/the-political-economy-of-stabilisation-funds-measuring-their-success-in- 
resource-dependent-countries-rs. 
Bauer, Andrew, Subnational Oil, Gas and Mineral Revenue Management. Revenue Watch Institute: 
New York (2013). http://www.revenuewatch.org/publications/fact_sheets/subnational-oil-gas-
and-mineral-revenue-management. 
Baunsgaard, Thomas et al., Fiscal Frameworks for Resource Rich Developing Countries. IMF Staff 
Discussion Note 12/04. IMF: Washington, D.C. (2012). http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
sdn/2012/sdn1204.pdf. 
Bazoobandi, Sara, Political Economy of the Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Case Study of Iran, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Routledge: New York (2012).
Bolton, Patrick, Frederic Samama and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), Sovereign Wealth Funds and Long-
Term Investing. Colombia University Press: New York (2012).
Castelli, Massilmilliano and Fabio Scacciavillani, The New Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 
Wiley: West Sussex (2012).
Clark, Gordon L., Adam D. Dixon and Ashby H.B. Monk, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Legitimacy,  
Governance, and Global Power. Princeton University Press: Princeton (2013). 
Collier, Paul, Rick Van der Ploeg, Michael Spence and Tony Venables, Managing Resource Revenues 
in Developing Countries. IMF Staff Paper, Vol. 57, No. 1 (2010). 
Collier, Paul and Anthony J. Venables (eds.), Plundered Nations? Successes and Failures in Natural 
Resource Extraction. Palgrave Macmillan: New York (2011). 
Das, Udaibir S., Adnan Mazarei and Han van der Hoorn, Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds:  
Issues for Policymakers. IMF: Washington, D.C. (2010).
Davis, J.M., R. Ossowski and A. Fedelino, Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil- 
Producing Countries. IMF: Washington, D.C. (2003).
Humphreys, Macartan, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), Escaping the Resource Curse. 
Columbia UP: New York (2007).




Revenue Watch Institute Natural Resource Fund Governance: The Essentials
IMF Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks for Resource Rich Developing Countries. IMF: Washington, 
D.C. (2012). http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/082412.pdf. 
IWG Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (“Santiago Principles”), 2008. 
http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.
Johnson-Calari, Jennifer and Malan Rietveld, Sovereign Wealth Management. Central Banking  
Publications: London (2007).
Kalyuzhnova, Yelena, Economics of the Caspian Oil and Gas Wealth: Companies, Governments,  
Policies. Palgrave Macmillan: New York (2008). 
Natural Resource Charter, 2014.  
http://naturalresourcecharter.org/content/natural-resource-charter-pdf. 
The 2013 Resource Governance Index. Revenue Watch Institute: New York.  
http://www.revenuewatch.org/rgi.   
Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus, Fiscal Institutions in Resource-Rich Economies: Lessons from Chile and  
Norway. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Instituto de Economía Working Paper 416 
(2012). http://www.economia.puc.cl/docs/dt_416.pdf. 
Truman, Edwin, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Threat or Salvation? Peterson Institute for International 
Economics: Washington, D.C. (2010). 
Tsalik, Svetlana, Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will Benefit? Open Society Institute: New York (2003).
Yi-chong, Xu and Gawdat Bahgat, The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds. Palgrave  
Macmillan: Eastbourne (2010).
35
Institutional Structure  
of Natural Resource Funds
Andrew Bauer and Malan Rietveld 
Key messages
•  A clear division of responsibilities—for example, between the legislature, president or prime 
minister, fund manager, operational manager and external managers—can help funds meet 
their objectives and prevent corruption.
•  Putting day-to-day management in the hands of a capable and politically independent body 
with strong internal controls can help meet investment targets and prevent mismanagement. 
The choice of where to house this day-to-day operational manager—whether as a unit  
within the central bank, a unit in the ministry of finance, as a separate entity or at a custodial 
institution—is context-specific. 
•  Formal advisory bodies, drawn from the academic and policymaking communities, have 
made significant contributions to improving fund governance at the national level in  
countries like Chile, Ghana, Norway and Timor-Leste and at the subnational level in the 
United States.
•  Codes of conduct and monitoring systems to prevent misconduct by the fund’s executive, 
staff and external managers are useful tools for preventing patronage, nepotism and  
corruption. In order to be effective, such mechanisms must be vigorously enforced.
•  Good fund governance requires that appropriate organization, staffing policies and internal 
controls be complemented by transparency, independent oversight and the political will to 
follow the rules.
What is natural resource fund management and why is it important?
Government decisions about the institutional structure, staffing policies and internal controls of a 
natural resource fund (NRF) have a huge impact on a fund’s success. Establishing an effective  
organizational structure, clear lines of communication between different levels of the institu-
tional hierarchy and a strong internal chain of accountability, both within an NRF and between 
the fund and higher authorities, can:
•  Help the fund meet its objectives (e.g., savings; budget stabilization) by aligning the goals  
and strategic direction set by political authorities with the day-to-day decisions taken by 
operational and investment managers
•  Prevent misuse of resource revenues for political purposes
• Prevent corruption by officials or external managers
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Policy Brief By contrast, a poorly designed management system can undermine government strategy and 
impede good governance. In particular, a failure to clarify roles and responsibilities of different 
bodies—such as internal advisory committees, board members and managing directors—can lead 
to turf wars or, at the other extreme, neglect of essential work.
In one notorious example of poor fund management, the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) 
invested $7 billion in Spanish firms beginning in the mid-1980s. By 1992, these investments 
had declined in value to $2 billion. According to audits and newspaper reports, these losses were 
facilitated by an absence of internal controls, supervision and transparency. For instance, the  
in-house managers of the London-based KIA subsidiary that made the investments refused to 
share trading information with the executive committee, which was meant to oversee fund  
activities. This system made possible not only mismanagement of assets but also high  
commissions and profits for insiders. In response, parliament now oversees KIA activities,  
a monitoring system was established and internal operational rules were tightened.1
This policy brief focuses on NRF institutional structure, both at the macrolevel and within the 
body responsible for the fund’s day-to-day operational management (the “operational manager”). 
The macromanagement structure involves the relationship between lawmakers, the executive, 
various advisory bodies, the auditor-general and the operational manager, which may be located  
within a ministry or the central bank, or in a separate dedicated organization. The internal man-
agement structure of the operational management entity involves a governing or supervisory 
board, the fund’s executive office or committee, and various units organized around its front, 
middle and back office, which deal with investments (and possibly external fund managers), 
risk management and settlements, respectively (see Figure 1 for a model NRF organogram). The 
operational manager must also set standards for staff compensation and ethical behavior as well 
as ensure appropriate administrative capacity to meet the fund’s mandate. Where applicable, 
the policy brief highlights the variations in the distribution of authority and responsibility seen 
among a number of well-established NRFs.
The macromanagement structure
The macromanagement structure refers to the high-level arrangement among the legislative 
branch, executive branch, policy advisers and the senior operational management of the fund. 
This section outlines the different roles each of these actors may play. Specifically, it describes the 
impact of decisions on how and where funds are established, which body has ultimate control 
over fund behavior, which body manages the fund, who advises the fund manager, and how and 
by whom day-to-day operations are carried out. Finally, it discusses the role of legislatures in  
fund management.
Where and how is the fund physically established?
Natural resource funds can be established through the constitution or by legislation, regulation 
or executive decree. Though rare, national or subnational constitutions can call for the establish-
ment of a fund. For example, Article 153 of the Niger Constitution makes reference to the creation 
of a petroleum fund. In the United States, Article IX, Section 15, of the State Constitution of Alaska 
establishes the Alaska Permanent Fund. The Alabama, North Dakota and Wyoming funds were 
also created through constitutional amendments. North Dakota took the process one step further 
by asking voters to approve the fund’s creation.
1  Sara Bazoobandi. Political Economy of the Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Case Study of Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
New York: Routledge, 2012.
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Options
• Legislature  
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•  Approves deposits and withdrawals
•  Approves fund manager decisions
•  Chooses and dismisses the  
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•  Approves changes to risk management 
and reporting processes
•  Advise or approve changes to asset  
allocation or eligible assets 
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Policy Brief More commonly, funds are established through legislation (e.g., Abu Dhabi [UAE]; Alberta  
[Canada]; Botswana; Chile; Ghana; Norway; Russia; Timor-Leste; Trinidad and Tobago) or  
by executive decree (e.g., Azerbaijan; Kuwait). While the permanency of a constitution can  
institutionalize a long-term vision for managing resource revenues and promote policy consis-
tency over many years, legislation and decrees are more flexible and often more detailed. 
No matter what method is used in its establishment, by definition an NRF is ultimately owned by 
the government. That said, a fund can be set up legally as a unit within the central bank, as a unit 
within the ministry of finance or revenue authority, or as a separate legal entity. 
The decision of where to physically locate the fund can have significant implications for fund 
transparency, accountability and effectiveness. For example, where central banks are indepen-
dent professional public institutions with a high degree of operational capacity, placing the funds 
in the central bank’s control can help prevent mismanagement. The governments of Botswana, 
Ghana, Norway, Russia and Trinidad and Tobago have each chosen to have their central banks host 
their respective funds on their behalf. Since subnational governments do not often have formal 
relationships with their central banks, subnational funds may be located within a nonpolitical 
department, such as the Department of Revenue (e.g., Alaska [USA]).
Abu Dhabi (UAE), Alberta (Canada), Azerbaijan and Kuwait have each chosen to establish separate 
entities to manage their natural resource funds. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), 
Alberta Investment Management Corporation, the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan 
(SOFAZ) and KIA are essentially parastatals reporting directly to the executive. In low-capacity 
environments, this approach can generate islands of expertise within the government capable 
of managing complex financial instruments. However, creating these institutions can also be a 
way to maneuver around reporting and oversight requirements associated with central bank or 
ministry activities. 
Many funds choose to appoint a custodial institution—such as JPMorgan Chase, BNY Mellon or 
Northern Trust—to hold their assets in safekeeping and perform additional financial services 
such as arranging settlements or administer tax-related documents. Custodial institutions 
are completely independent of the government, which can help minimize the chance of fund 
mismanagement. However, private banks can charge large management fees. Where custodial in-
stitutions are used, it may be important to set strict guidelines on their mandate and fee structure. 
Who has ultimate control of the fund?
The body with ultimate control either approves the decisions of the fund manager or has the right 
to dismiss the fund manager. Regardless of where the fund is physically located, ultimate control 
over fund activities can rest with the legislature, the executive or the central bank. In Alaska 
(USA), Norway and Trinidad and Tobago, for example, the legislature approves the fund’s annual  
budget. In Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the president has ultimate control. In Chile, Russia and 
Timor-Leste, the minister of finance has ultimate control, though that person reports to the 
president or prime minister. In a unique case, the Central Bank of Botswana’s Board of Governors 
is responsible for the Pula Fund. 
Who is the formal fund manager?
The fund manager sets investment guidelines and deposits or withdraws money from the fund. 
While the details vary from fund to fund, typically the official fund manager is a part of the  
executive branch (e.g., Office of the President, Office of the Prime Minister or Ministry of Finance), 
though responsibilities are sometimes delegated to a special body (e.g., Supervisory Board in 
Azerbaijan) or the central bank. While executive control allows the most senior government  
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officials to better coordinate government policy—for example, by ensuring that investment policy 
is consistent with fund objectives and that withdrawals are consistent with the government’s 
macroeconomic framework—it may also politicize decisions around fund investments, inflows 
and outflows. 
In some cases—for example, in Alaska (USA), Ghana, Timor-Leste and Trinidad and Tobago— 
legislation dictates the conditions under which deposits and withdrawals can be made,  
limiting the discretionary powers of the fund manager to manage (see section below on  
legislative oversight for more details). In others—for example, Norway—while there is no  
legislation, the parliament does control deposits and withdrawals. However, in most cases,  
the fund manager has a large degree of discretion, subject to oversight by the body with  
ultimate control over fund activities and independent monitoring groups.
What formal advisory bodies support the fund manager?
Many fund managers make use of formal advisory bodies whose members are drawn largely from 
the academic and policymaking community within or outside the country or region. In some 
cases, a formal advisory committee can in fact wield significant influence or even constrain 
government decision making—for instance, by approving and controlling withdrawals from NRFs 
(e.g., Chad’s Collège de Contrôle et de Surveillance des Ressources Pétrolières). In other cases, it 
may simply make nonbinding recommendations and provide in-depth research and advice to  
the fund’s executive committee (e.g., Alaska’s Investment Advisory Group; Ghana’s Investment  
Advisory Committee; North Dakota’s Legacy and Budget Stabilization Fund Advisory Board). 
Chile has one of the most elaborate sets of advisory bodies, some with binding formal powers and 
some without. The Advisory Committee for Trend GDP provides the Chilean Ministry of Finance 
with key projections that are used to calculate trend GDP and the output gap. The Advisory Com-
mittee for the Reference Copper Price provides the ministry with projections of the international 
long-term copper price. These two inputs are particularly important in Chile where objective  
projections of trend GDP and copper prices are used to calculate how much revenue to save and 
spend in any given year according to the fiscal rule. In this context, relatively accurate calcula-
tions are essential for helping mitigate expenditure volatility and saving revenues for future 
generations. The projections are binding on the government.
Chile also has an Advisory Committee for Fiscal Responsibility Funds—otherwise known as the 
Financial Committee—that is responsible for evaluating fund management by the Central Bank of 
Chile and issuing recommendations about fund investment policy and regulation to the Ministry 
of Finance as well as the two houses of Congress. While the committee’s recommendations are 
not binding, a press release after each meeting and publication of an annual report on the funds’ 
financial results and its recommendations on investment policy pressures the government to 
implement its recommendations.2 
In the case of the Norwegian Pension Fund Global, the advisory structures (consisting of academ-
ics and investment consultants) serve on a much more ad hoc basis, providing detailed commis-
sioned research to the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, the Norges Bank (Norway’s central bank) 
Executive Board and the fund’s executives on long-term strategic investments, risks and oppor-
tunities, the fund’s investment performance, and changes and trends in the financial markets 
and investment industry. Reports and presentations submitted by the fund’s external advisers are 
made public.
2  Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel. “Fiscal Institutions in Resource-Rich Economies: Lessons from Chile and Norway” (working paper 416, Instituto de 
Economia, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2012). 
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Policy Brief Who is the day-to-day operational manager?
While the executive branch is usually the official fund manager, it often delegates day-to-day  
trading on financial markets, the selection and oversight of external portfolio managers and 
reporting duties to an operational manager. The operational manager can be chosen among the 
ministry of finance, central bank or a separate entity (see Table 1 for examples of the division  
of responsibilities). The operational manager, in turn, can delegate asset management  
responsibilities to a special unit within the central bank or external managers. 
Azerbaijan Botswana Chile Norway












Operational manager Executive Director  
of the State Oil Fund 
of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan (SOFAZ)
Bank of Botswana 
Investment  
Committee





Physical location Bank of New York 
Mellon and National 
Depository Center  
of the Republic  
of Azerbaijan




In the Norwegian case, which is widely regarded as an exemplary model of governance and  
intragovernmental organization, the parliament set the fund’s legal framework in the  
Government Pension Fund Act, the Ministry of Finance has the formal responsibility over the 
fund’s management, operational management is relegated to the Norges Bank, and Norges  
Bank’s Executive Board has delegated fund management to a unit within the bank called the 
Norges Bank Investment Management (see Figure 2).3 
 
3  “A Clear Division of Roles and Effective Controls,” Norges Bank Investment Management,  
http://www.nbim.no/en/About-us/governance-model.
Table 1: 
Division of responsibilities 
over fund management in  
four resource-rich countries
Figure 2: 
Management structure for 
the Norwegian Government 
Pension Fund Global
Source: Norges Bank Investment  
Management
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A fund’s objectives and investment strategy should help determine which body acts as the  
operational manager (see Figure 3). In general, funds with relatively less complicated and  
low-risk investments, such as stabilization funds that invest exclusively in money-market  
instruments and highly liquid, short-duration sovereign bonds, can be placed under the  
operational management of agencies without extensive experience in managing complex  
financial instruments. These funds require comparatively less investment expertise and  
discretionary judgment, as they are essentially managed as cash balances within the overall  
fiscal framework or annual budget process. 
In practice, many countries give their national central banks operational responsibility for the 
management of stabilization funds. This is due to their operational capacity for managing the 
kind of investments that stabilization funds make, which are typically very similar to those of the 
central bank’s foreign exchange reserves. In addition, central banks tend to enjoy high levels  
of credibility and professionalism, which can make them good custodians of public assets.  
Examples of stabilization funds managed by central banks include the Algerian Revenue  
Regulation Fund, Trinidad and Tobago’s Heritage and Stabilization Fund and Venezuela’s  
Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund. 
For NRFs with more complex investment strategies that require specialist skills—such as more 
diversified sovereign bonds, corporate bonds, equities and alternative assets—the operational 
management of the fund is typically relegated to a special unit within the central bank or a 
separate, dedicated fund management structure. In practice, when the allocation to more com-
plex asset classes is largely done through “passive allocations,”4 the central bank often retains 
operational responsibility. This is true in Botswana, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Norway, Timor-Leste, and 
Trinidad and Tobago. In such cases, government ministries still have critical roles to play in terms 
of oversight and setting long-term strategic objectives for the fund. In addition, ministries need to 
ensure that NRF policies and cash flows are coordinated with other areas of economic policy, such 
as the annual budget and (in the case of domestic development funds) with public spending and 
investment more generally.
Where investment managers are given more discretion to take risks or where funds are owned by 
subnational governments, a dedicated investment management agency, corporation or authority 
is often created, as in the cases of Abu Dhabi (UAE), Alaska (USA), Alberta (Canada), Brunei,  
Kuwait, Nigeria and Qatar. The Alaskan NRF, for example, is managed by the Alaska Permanent 
Fund Corporation, which is described as “a quasi-independent state entity, designed to be  
insulated from political decisions yet accountable to the people as a whole.”5 
4  This means that the fund essentially attempts to follow the movement of the market by tracking an index. Passive management is opposed 
to active management, where investor skill is employed to attempt to “outperform” the market.
5 Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, “An Alaskan’s Guide to the Permanent Fund,” 2009
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Policy Brief Finally, in low-capacity environments or where investment strategies are more complex,  
operational managers—whether they are central banks or separate entities—often hire external 
managers. This puts the operational manager in the position of being a “manager of managers.” 
While it may sound simple, managing the managers can be an incredibly analytical and data-
intensive process (see Box 1).
Box 1: Manager of managers 
Natural resource funds (NRFs) often make use of external fund or portfolio managers. This is true 
for funds that are largely passively managed (in which case fees are much lower), but more typically 
when the NRF’s management seeks additional returns by outperforming the market using active 
strategies (which involve higher fees). The reasons for using external managers include: (i) the per-
ceived superior technical and infrastructural capacity of external managers; (ii) allocations to highly 
specialized asset classes, such as real estate and land, private equity, emerging market debt and 
equities, and small-cap equities; and (iii) the need to develop internal investment capacity through 
technical training and skills transfer from an external manager. 
The management of an NRF using external investment managers needs to guard against the 
principal-agent problem. Investment managers often push the sale of complex and high-risk  
financial instruments for at least two reasons. First, there are often higher fees associated with  
trade in more complex investments. Second, performance bonuses may be linked to large returns, 
while the external manager may not bear the burden of financial losses. 
Operational managers can guard against excessive risk-taking, high fees and mismanagement in  
at least three ways. Following the customs of the investment industry, the NRF can involve a well-
regarded global investment consulting firm to conduct a rigorous selection process. Operational 
managers can constrain the options available to external managers through strict investment 
guidelines and mandated restrictions. Finally, operational managers must constantly monitor and 
scrutinize their external managers. 
The key point for legislators and other oversight bodies is that the use of external managers does 
not reduce the operational managers’ responsibilities. Being a prudent and effective “manager of 
managers” requires comprehensive information systems, sound internal processes and constant 
monitoring, interaction and evaluation.
What role does the legislature play in overseeing the fund?
Legislators often have ultimate authority over establishing what the NRF can and cannot do. In 
many cases, NRFs are created through the passage of an act or a law that establishes most of the 
fundamental aspects of the fund, such as its purpose, deposit and withdrawal rules, investment 
objectives, risk tolerance and eligible assets. In short, parliamentary lawmakers often set the  
goalposts, even if the responsibility for scoring goals is delegated to other authorities. 
Lawmakers also serve an important role in the year-by-year management and operation of any 
NRF, as well as potentially serving a critical role in ensuring appropriate levels of oversight,  
transparency and accountability. With regard to the former function, the most transparent,  
accountable and professionally run NRFs produce extension reports, presentations and  
testimonies to parliament. The relationship should be two-way. On the one hand, legislators 
should ask tough (but informed) questions around the fund’s inflows and outflows, investment  
performance, management of risk and decision-making process. On the other hand, the NRF’s 
managers should inform the legislature whenever the legal framework and provisions of the fund 
need to be changed in order to make prudent investment decisions (for example, if the fund needs 
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to be allowed to invest in new asset classes or to implement certain derivatives strategies in order 
to manage risk or enhance long-term investment returns). 
In Norway, for example, the Storting (legislative body) approves the Government Pension Fund 
Global’s annual budget, appoints members of a fund supervisory council and reviews the council’s 
reports. In addition, legislative committees are often established to hold hearings and report on 
legal compliance, as well as identify cases of government mismanagement. In the Canadian prov-
ince of Alberta, a standing committee is tasked with approving the fund business plan annually, 
reviewing quarterly reports on fund operations, approving the fund’s annual report, reporting to 
the legislature on whether the fund is meeting its objectives and holding public meetings with 
Albertans on fund activities.6
The internal management structure
This section turns to the internal management structure within the operational management  
entity. A key decision is how to establish appropriate senior management and oversight struc-
tures. A commonly encountered management structure is a governing or supervisory board that 
oversees an executive committee or managing director. Front, middle and back offices, which 
handle investments, risk management and settlements, respectively, report to the executive  
committee or managing director. The separation and specification of duties of the different  
bodies may feature small variations from fund to fund but are broadly summarized below.
What is the operational manager’s highest authority?
Most NRFs with significant assets under management and relatively sophisticated investment 
processes have a governing or supervisory board that sits on top of the fund’s executive commit-
tee or managing director (though the managing director may sit on the board). The board, which 
is accountable to the official fund manager, typically approves the fund’s budgets, strategic plans 
and changes to the investment, risk management and reporting processes. If the board is granted 
a relatively high degree of authority, it may advise on—and in some cases even approve—changes 
to the fund’s asset allocation, permitted investment strategies and eligible assets (a less empow-
ered board may simply help the executive communicate and explain these requirements to the 
ministry and/or parliament). The board typically reports to the minister of finance, council of 
ministers and/or parliament.
Board membership varies greatly from country-to-country, from technocratic independent 
experts to government officials to senior members of the executive branch of government. In 
Canada, the Alberta Investment Management Corporation’s Board of Directors consists entirely  
of experienced private-sector executives appointed by the government. In Botswana, where the 
Pula Fund is managed by the central bank, the Board of Governors consists of the Governor of the 
Bank of Botswana, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and seven other members of 
various backgrounds appointed by the Minister of Finance. The SOFAZ Supervisory Board  
consists of government ministers, central bankers, parliamentarians and other Azerbaijani  
officials. Finally, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority’s Board of Directors consists almost  
entirely of members of the ruling family. 
In some more authoritarian systems, it is common for representatives of the fund manager to sit 
on the board. For example, in the cases of Azerbaijan’s State Oil Fund, Kazakhstan’s National Fund, 
the Kuwait Investment Authority and the Qatar Investment Authority, ministers, the speaker of 
parliament, economic advisers to the president or even the president himself may sit on the board 
of a supposedly independent operational manager.




Policy Brief Executive committee or managing director
The executive committee or the managing director is the highest management structure within 
the operational management entity. Its function is to bear responsibility and oversee all aspects 
of the investment process, across the front, middle and back offices. The executive committee or 
managing director is also responsible for allocating the internal operational budget, managing 
the internal audit, strategic and organizational planning and all aspects of staffing policy (human 
resources management, compensation, recruitment and training).
Where the operational manager is a state-owned corporation or entity, the executive reports to  
a board of governors or directors. For example, in Azerbaijan the SOFAZ Executive Director,  
though appointed by the president, reports to the Supervisory Board. In Abu Dhabi, the Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority’s Executive Committee reports to the Board of Directors. Where the central 
bank is the operational manager, the executive typically reports directly to the Minister of Finance 
(e.g., Chile; Botswana; Ghana: Norway; Russia).
Front office (investments)
The front office is the NRF’s investment team (for further details on investment strategies, see 
policy brief on “Rules-Based Investment for Natural Resource Funds”). The exact specification of 
tasks and functions to be performed by the front office will depend on the size of the fund’s assets 
under management, its basic investment style (passive, active or mixed), the size and number of 
external management mandates it operates and the complexity of the investment strategies being 
pursued. For larger organizations the views and concerns of the front office are consolidated and 
communicated to senior management and oversight bodies through an investment committee or 
department. The front office usually reports to the chief executive and chief investment officer of 
the fund. The following are tasks commonly associated with the front office:
•  Investing internal portfolios, including trading in financial instruments
• Researching and analyzing financial market trends and asset valuations
•  Monitoring the performance and managing the relationship with external fund managers7
•  Facilitating feedback and skills transfer between external managers and the fund’s employees
•  Communicating and articulating the fund’s evolving market views and investment  
philosophy, process and decisions
•  Preparing quarterly and annual investment reports to the executive committee, as well as the 
governing board, ministry of finance and other external stakeholders
Middle office (risk management)
The middle office consists of the risk management and performance and attribution team. As 
with the front office, the views of the middle office can be consolidated and coordinated through  
a Risk Committee or Department that reports to senior management structures. The middle  
office usually reports to the chief operating officer and/or the chief investment officer. Some of 
the important tasks performed by the middle office are:
•  Measure, monitor and manage all operational, credit, counterparty and market risk
•  Propose appropriate asset allocation based on risk profile
•  Enhance risk forecasting and modeling capabilities
•  Establish, recommend and maintain benchmarks
•  Determine how returns of the various portfolios are obtained by attributing the measured 
return to investment decisions made and the various internal and external managers
7  In a small number of cases, the oversight of external managers is the responsibility of the middle office. This is typically when external 
managers are tasked with pursuing highly passive (low fee) investment strategies that largely follow the market. In such cases, the moni-
toring of external managers essentially becomes exclusively a risk management issue, ensuring that external managers are not adding to 
underlying market risks by taking active bets of market movements.
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Back office (settlements)
The back-office function is responsible for what is often described as “post-trade” activities that 
are critical to accurate and timely recording and documentation of investment activities (for 
further details on reporting, see policy brief on “Natural Resource Fund Transparency”). Many 
institutional investors, including public investors, outsource much of the back-office function 
to established custodians and asset servicing firms such as BNY Mellon, State Street, JPMorgan 
Chase or Citigroup. In such cases, the NRF’s back office is responsible for supervising and  
interacting with external service providers, and ensuring that the required data is received in 
a timely and accurate manner and integrated with the central bank’s own IT systems. The back 
office usually reports to the chief operating officer and chief financial officer. Some of the most 
important tasks performed by the back office include:
•  Financial reporting and accounting in compliance with the NRF’s stated accounting  
framework and standards, and in compliance with regulatory and tax requirements 
• Clearing and settlement of trades
The back office also conducts internal audits and interacts with external auditors. An internal  
audit is an examination and evaluation of an organization or system’s internal controls.  
The goal of a natural resource fund internal audit is usually to assess compliance with  
governance and investment rules and make recommendations to improve the effectiveness  
of governance processes.
Nearly all NRFs have internal audits, overseen by an audit committee or internal auditor.  
These audits can either be performed in-house or by independent auditors. Internal audits are 
submitted to the executive committee or managing director. While some governments (e.g., 
Alaska [USA]; Chile; Ghana; North Dakota [USA]; Norway; Trinidad and Tobago) release their  
NRF internal audit reports to the public as a means of improving internal governance, this is  
not yet standard practice.
Preventing misconduct by managers and staff
Allegations of conflict of interest or outright misuse of public office for private gain by NRF board 
members, managers or staff is not unheard of. The Kuwaiti example in the first section of this 
policy brief is but one instance. Many of the Libyan Investment Authority’s assets are yet to be 
identified, generating speculation of corruption or conflict of interest. And recently members of 
the Nigerian House of Representatives accused a manager at the Nigerian Sovereign Investment 
Authority of contracting his former employer, UBS Securities, as an external manager without  
following due process.8  
Appropriate governance rules, internal supervision, external oversight and transparency are  
the key elements in preventing such mismanagement. However, codes of conduct and  
preventing conflicts of interest are also important. Most NRFs set out behavioral guidelines  
for board members, executives and staff, either in legislation or in manuals. These typically  
require individuals to disclose potential conflicts of interest and financial interests, while  
introducing significant penalties for abuse of inside information, fraud and unethical behavior. 
The most effective of these codes and guidelines clearly articulate the legal and professional  
implications of misconduct and unethical behavior, and establish clear processes for dealing  
with it once it is suspected or detected. Ideally, a compliance officer should be appointed to





ensure compliance with applicable laws, regulations and standards around ethics, conflicts  
of interest and misconduct.9 
The University of Texas Investment Management Company’s Code of Ethics is a good example of 
a comprehensive code of conduct for fund managers and staff.10 It includes sections on conflict 
of interest, acceptance of gifts, nepotism and financial disclosures. While the Texas Permanent 
University Fund’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is responsible for enforcing the code, the Board of 
Directors is the highest authority in charge of ensuring that the CEO does so.
Conclusion
Research and practical experience among NRFs demonstrate that—along with strong transparency 
requirements, external oversight and the political will to manage resource revenues well— 
effective management and organizational structures are key determinants of good fund  
governance. Management structures that set out clear and unambiguous roles, powers and  
responsibilities for governing bodies and staff promote prudent investment and prevent  
misconduct, corruption and mismanagement. 
The specific choices around who has ultimate authority over the fund, who manages the fund, 
how the operational manager is organized, where the fund is physically located and how these 
bodies interact, must be context-specific. Policymakers and oversight bodies have significant 
scope for pragmatically tailoring fund management structures in accordance with local require-
ments, preferences and competencies. That said, it is preferable to involve a number of public 
agencies and institutions—for example, ministries, central banks, public investment bodies, 
legislators and auditors—in the management process. In this way, different bodies can monitor 
one another, promote compliance with governance rules and make sure that the government is 
managing natural resource revenues in the public interest. 
9  Cornelia Hammer, Peter Kunzel and Iva Petrova, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: Current Institutional and Operational Practices”  
(working paper, International Monetary Fund 08/254, 2008). http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08254.pdf.
10  The University of Texas Investment Management Company’s Code of Ethics can be found at http://www.utimco.org/extranet/ 
WebData/CORPORATE/CodeofEthics.pdf. 
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Fiscal Rules for Natural Resource 
Funds: How to Develop and  
Operationalize an Appropriate Rule
Andrew Bauer
Key messages
•  Natural resource funds by themselves do not guarantee sound macroeconomic management. 
In fact, they may complicate budgeting and make public spending less accountable.
•  Fiscal rules—multiyear constraints on government spending or public debt accumulation—
can help commit successive governments to stable macroeconomic policy, which is  
necessary for growing and diversifying an economy dependent on large, finite and volatile 
natural resource revenues. While some natural resource funds are governed by fiscal rules 
while others are not, fiscal rules generally improve government performance and public 
financial management. 
•  The Alaska (USA), Chile, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Norway, Timor-Leste, and Trinidad and Tobago 
natural resource funds are governed by fiscal rules that generate savings in years when oil, 
gas or mineral prices or production are high.
•  The design of fiscal rules should depend on context; no single rule is appropriate for every 
country. For example, if a country needs financing for development projects and has the 
“absorptive capacity” to implement projects proficiently and efficiently, then the government 
may wish to spend more and save less. However, the government may also wish to save a 
significant fraction of resource revenues to generate a buffer in case of economic disaster or 
unanticipated downturns in oil, gas or mineral production or prices.
•  In order to function properly, fiscal rules must be designed with specific objectives in mind 
(e.g., to address absorptive capacity constraints; to stabilize the budget), there must be politi-
cal consensus on their suitability and they must be enforced through independent oversight.
•  Most natural resource funds have deposit and withdrawal rules, which usually operationalize 
a fiscal rule. Their details matter a lot since they can sustain or undermine fiscal rules.
What are fiscal rules and why are they useful?
Resource-rich countries often face three major macroeconomic challenges: Dutch Disease,  
short- to medium-term pro-cyclical fiscal policy and long-run boom-bust cycles. 
During peak production on a new mine or oil or gas field, usually several years after production 
starts, a government may be flooded with a sudden cash windfall. Often, the government spends 
this entire windfall, without saving a portion. While government officials, politicians and the 
general public may expect spending to improve schools, electricity and other public services, the 
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Policy Brief result instead may be a rise in domestic wages and prices without any substantial development 
outcome. Alternatively, the inflow of money can lead to exchange rate appreciation, which can 
harm domestic exporters. Together, these effects can cause a decline in non-oil or non-mineral 
industries and a lower standard of living for those disconnected from the resource sector.  
This is commonly known as Dutch Disease.1 There is strong evidence of Dutch Disease effects in 
Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, as well as at the subnational level  
in Brazil, Indonesia and Peru.
The extent of the damage caused by the Dutch Disease depends in part on the absorptive capacity 
of the economy and the government. If the economy and the government can easily absorb the 
inflow of cash, then the Dutch Disease can be mitigated. The ability to overcome the Dutch  
Disease depends, in part, on the existence of local public sector expertise to plan budgets,  
appraise projects and carry out public tenders efficiently, as well as the number and quality of 
engineers, construction workers, teachers or doctors to absorb new government spending.2
Second, governments are often disposed to spend what they receive in revenues. Since oil, gas and 
mineral prices and production are highly volatile, most resource-dependent governments exhibit 
“pro-cyclical fiscal policy,” a tendency to increase spending when revenues go up and decrease 
spending when revenues decline. Temporary windfalls generate substantial incentives to spend 
now when revenues are high, leading to poor public expenditure decisions—for example, con-
struction of concert halls, new airports and other legacy projects—and poor quality infrastructure 
since it takes time to adequately plan and execute projects. When revenues decline, governments 
often face debt crises or are unable to pay for government salaries or operations and maintenance 
of new infrastructure. The impact on the private sector can be equally devastating as businesses 
invest when they receive government contracts and scale back or go bankrupt when government 
contracts dry up.
Third, oil, gas and minerals are finite resources. Some large mines or oil fields only generate sig-
nificant revenues for a decade, while others produce for several. Yet many resource-rich countries 
do not save or invest for the benefit of future generations when they are receiving their revenue 
windfalls, leading to a long boom period followed by an economic recession or even a depression. 
Nauru, a country rich in phosphates, is a case in point. It consumed its mineral wealth rather than 
saving or investing it. Following the start of large-scale production, Nauru went from one of  
the world’s poorest nations to one of its richest, with GDP peaking at $25,500 per citizen (2005 
dollars) in 1973. By 2007, it had once again dropped to one of the world’s poorest, with GDP less 
than $1,900 per citizen. The economy never recovered.
A fiscal rule is a multiyear constraint on overall government finances defined by a numerical  
target (see Table 1 for examples). Fiscal rules can act as a commitment mechanism, binding  
successive governments to a long-term budgetary target and therefore a long-term vision of  
public financial management. 
Fiscal rules are necessary given the finite and destabilizing nature of oil, gas and mineral  
revenues. They can discourage overspending and waste by limiting a government’s ability to  
grow expenditures too quickly. They can encourage governments to employ “counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy” to mitigate the negative effects of revenue volatility (see Figure 1). And they can 
enhance the credibility of a government’s commitment to stable fiscal policy, thereby stimulating 
1  Dutch Disease refers to the negative effects on domestic trading industries, deindustrialization and resource dependence that can occur  
as a result of real exchange rate appreciation (rising prices/wages or a nominal exchange rate appreciation).
2  Dutch Disease may also be mitigated in three other ways: fiscal sterilization (the government saving resource revenues in foreign  
assets through a natural resource fund), monetary sterilization (the central bank saving resource revenues as foreign currency reserves)  
or revenues exiting the country through capital flight. 
Fiscal Rules for Natural Resource Funds: How to Develop and Operationalize an Appropriate Rule
49
private investment. That said, in order to function properly, they must be designed with specific 
objectives in mind (e.g., to address absorptive capacity constraints; to stabilize the budget), there 
must be political consensus on their suitability and they must be enforced. Enforcement can be 
encouraged through formal agreement between political parties, independent control over the 
fiscal framework, judicial oversight, legislative oversight, independent audits, international peer 
pressure or having a well-informed and engaged citizenry and media to pressure the government 
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Chile (statutory  
since 2006)
Mongolia (statutory since 
2010; effective in 2013) 
Norway (political  
commitment since 2001)
Structural surplus of 1 percent of GDP with an 
escape clause. What constitutes a “structural  
balance” is informed by a 10-year forecast of  
copper and molybdenum revenues as determined  
by an independent committee. 
Structural deficit cannot exceed 2 percent of GDP.
Non-oil structural deficit of the central government 
cannot exceed 4 percent, which is the expected 
long-run real return on sovereign wealth  
fund investments. The fiscal guidelines allow  
temporary deviations from the rule under  
specific circumstances.
Debt rule Limit on  
public debt  
as a percent 
of GDP
Indonesia (coalition  
agreement since 2004)
Mongolia (statutory since 
2010; effective in 2014)
Total central and local government debt should 
not exceed 60 percent of GDP.
Public debt cannot exceed 40 percent of GDP.
Expenditure 
rule






rates, or in  
percent of GDP
Botswana (statutory  
since 2003)
Mongolia (statutory since 
2010; effective in 2013)
Peru (statutory since 
2003; rule changed in 
2009)
Ceiling on the expenditure-to-GDP ratio  
of 40 percent. 
Expenditure growth limited to non-mineral  
GDP growth.
Real growth current expenditure ceiling of  







or revenues  
from oil, gas  
or minerals 
Alaska (statutory  
since 1976)
Botswana (political  
commitment since 1994)




Timor-Leste (statutory  
since 2005) 
Trinidad and Tobago  
(statutory since 2007)
50–75 percent of oil revenues minus income tax 
and property tax enters the budget; the rest is saved 
in the Alaska Permanent Fund, which saves some 
revenues and disburses the rest directly to citizens.
Mineral revenues may only be used for public 
investment or saved in the Pula Fund.
Maximum 70 percent of seven-year average of 
petroleum revenue enters the budget. Maximum 
21 percent is allocated to a Stabilization Fund. 
Minimum 9 percent is allocated to a Heritage 
Fund for future generations. Percentages subject 
to review every three years.
$8 billion USD plus/minus 15 percent (depending  
on economic growth) of petroleum revenue is 
transferred from the National Fund to the budget 
annually.
Revenue entering the budget from the Petroleum 
Fund cannot exceed 3 percent of national petro-
leum wealth. Exceptions made if the government  
provides a detailed explanation to parliament and 
certain reports.  
Maximum 40 percent of excess oil and gas  
revenue above estimated revenue is used to 
finance the budget; the rest goes into the  
Heritage and Stabilization Fund. An 11-year  
revenue average is used for budget estimates.
3  This is the footnote here but hidden
Table 1: 
Four Types of Fiscal Rules
Sources: RWI; Budina et al.,  
“Fiscal Rules at a Glance: Country  
Details from a New Dataset”  
(IMF Working Paper 12/273, 2012).
3   Overall fiscal balance means that  
expenditures equal revenues; primary  
fiscal balance means that total expenditures 
minus interest payments on debt equal rev-
enues; current fiscal balance means that total 
expenditures minus spending on capital expen-
ditures equal revenues; headline fiscal balance 
refers to expenditures equaling revenues at 
any time; structural fiscal balance refers to 
expenditures equaling revenues when the 
economy is working at “potential” or full 
capacity; a deficit refers to when expenditures 
are greater than revenues; a surplus is when 
revenues are greater than expenditures.
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Employing a fiscal rule in a resource-rich country will likely generate periods of fiscal surplus and 
deficit (see Figure 2). For example, let us assume that Peru’s government spends exactly what it 
receives in revenue in 2012 (i.e., it is in “fiscal balance”). If revenues grow by 5 percent in 2013, 
but the rule says that the government cannot increase expenditures faster than 4 percent per year, 
then Peru must decide what to do with the surplus revenue. Given the fiscal rule that limits  
additional spending, it only has three choices: lower taxes, use the surplus to pay down public 
debt or save the surplus in a sovereign wealth fund. Lowering taxes during a temporary windfall 
period may prove fiscally unsound in the long term and the country may already be in a sustain-
able public debt position, as is the case in Peru. Thus some fiscal rules can give rise to sovereign 
wealth funds/natural resource funds. In Peru’s case, the government has chosen to pay down the 
public debt; however, discussions are now taking place on creating a natural resource fund. 
Of course, some governments have established sovereign wealth funds without enacting  
fiscal rules or complying with existing rules. However, in these countries, macroeconomic and 
fiscal policy may be inconsistent, leading to volatile budgets, exchange rates or inflation (e.g., 
Kuwait), fiscal policy may be less credible, leading to weak private investment (e.g., Mexico) and 
government spending may be less accountable to the public, leading to poorer public investment 
decisions and execution (e.g., Azerbaijan).
In short, natural resource funds in and of themselves do not affect the pattern of government 
behavior. However, under the right circumstances, fiscal rules can give rise to natural resource 
funds, which in turn can provide a source of financing to support a steady scaling up of public 
investment, help stabilize budgets, and provide an endowment for future generations. 
What is an appropriate fiscal rule for a resource-rich government?
There is considerable academic debate around the appropriate fiscal rule for resource-rich 
governments. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has previously advocated for the so-called 
permanent income hypothesis (PIH) rule, which limits spending from oil, gas or mineral revenues 
in any given year to the interest accrued on all oil, gas and mineral wealth. The idea is that, since 
oil, gas and minerals are nonrenewable, consuming them today is unfair to future generations. In 
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Policy Brief Under this rule, extractive revenues would yield essentially the same amount of money for public 
spending for eternity, even though the original source of financing is finite (see Figure 4). This 
rule not only forces governments to save a significant proportion of natural resource revenue for 
future generations, especially at peak production, but also smooths expenditures, thereby ad-
dressing the budget volatility problem. However, the amount that governments are able to spend 
under the rule is susceptible to changes in oil, gas or mineral wealth estimates; governments can 
raise their price or production assumptions to make it seem like the value of all oil, gas or miner-
als is higher, thereby increasing the “fiscal space” available for current spending. Also, in devel-
oping countries that have significant infrastructure and social program financing needs, there 
may be good reason to increase spending in the early years of production to address development 
bottlenecks—like a shortage of electricity, clean water or qualified teachers—to spur growth and 
diversify the economy.
Recently the IMF’s views have shifted somewhat. Recognizing that capital-scarce developing 
countries require public financing to grow their economies, IMF staff is now advocating a two-
tiered approach. Governments in advanced economies should employ a PIH rule if they have less 
than a couple of decades of production remaining but may wish to employ a non-resource pri-
mary balance rule (e.g., Norway’s rule) or an expenditure growth rule coupled with a “smoothed” 
balanced budget rule if they have long-lasting resources (e.g., Chile’s rule). Governments in lower-
income countries without many years of production remaining should employ an expenditure 
growth rule coupled with a “flexible” non-resource primary balance rule or a PIH rule that allows 
a special allowance for more spending in early years of production, as in Timor-Leste. However, 
lower-income countries with many decades or even centuries of resources remaining may wish 
to employ an expenditure growth rule along with either a “smoothed” balanced budget rule, as in 
Chile, or a “flexible” non-resource primary balance rule (see Table 1 for explanations of the differ-
ent rules). The IMF’s decision tree is provided in Figure 3.
Figure 3: 
IMF Decision Tree on  
Fiscal Rules for Resource- 
Rich Countries
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While the IMF’s advice is now more nuanced and adaptable than the one-size-fits-all approach 
it has applied in the past, several notable academics including Paul Collier, Jeffrey Sachs and 
Michael Spence have suggested fiscal rules that take a more development-related approach. Fiscal 
policy should not focus exclusively on fiscal sustainability and intergenerational equity. Resource 
revenues should be used to finance public investments in infrastructure, government institu-
tions, and health and education first and foremost. It is true that fast scaling up of public invest-
ment can cause Dutch Disease if there is a lack of absorptive capacity; after all, increased spending 
can simply cause a higher demand for imports, appreciating the exchange rate or incentivizing 
local contractors to raise their prices rather than expand supply. However, if done properly, public 
spending can “crowd-in” private investment by creating an environment in which the private sec-
tor can become globally competitive. 
How much a government should spend on public investments or to boost immediate consump-
tion for the poor and how much should be saved in financial assets (i.e., in a natural resource 
fund) should depend on two elements: the social return to public investment and the need for 
precautionary savings to buffer unanticipated downswings in government revenue. In short, if 
a country urgently requires public investment for the economy to grow, the government spends 
money well (i.e., there is high public sector absorptive capacity), and there is private sector capac-
ity to build infrastructure and provide needed services, then the country is said to have a high 
social return to public investment. In this case, the government should spend more and save less. 
However, a government should actually save slightly more than a simple analysis of the social re-
turn to public investment would dictate since it will need a pool of funds to draw on to overcome 
cyclical downturns and prevent the boom-bust cycles so common in resource-rich countries 
(illustrated for Venezuela in Figure 1). Also, it may wish to offset the depletion of a finite asset and 
provide an inheritance for future generations. 
Fiscal rules should therefore reflect national objectives and country circumstances. For example, 
if the objective is to stabilize the budget, the government could employ an expenditure growth 
rule. If the objective is to stabilize the budget and save for future generations, it could employ a 
PIH-type rule or a revenue rule that is dependent on a long-term average of resource revenues. 
If the objective is to stabilize the budget and provide financing for development in early years of 
production but still have a pot of money in case of cyclical downturns or emergencies, then the 
government could employ a more eclectic rule, such as depositing 70 percent of an 11-year aver-
age of mineral revenues in the budget and depositing the remaining amount in a Petroleum or 
Mineral Stabilization Fund, which would be used to make up shortfalls in expected revenue (see 
intermediate rule in Figure 4). 
As a general guideline, the percentage saved should increase if there is a high expected rate of 
return on foreign investments, a fast depletion rate, or there is a large risk of negative fiscal or 
financial shocks to the economy. Conversely, fiscal space should increase as absorptive capacity 
rises, when there are significant development needs, when there is high absolute poverty, and if 
public debt is unsustainable and needs to be paid down (see Table 2). The domestic political situa-
tion should also be considered. If there is likely to be significant political pressure on the govern-
ment to spend more, the fiscal rule ought to allow for extra fiscal space, as in the Ghanaian case. 
On the other hand, if future governments are likely to spend revenues more effectively than the 
current government, it may be worthwhile to constrain today’s government’s freedom to spend. 
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Policy Brief Less Fiscal Space More Fiscal Space
Low government capacity to spend effectively High government capacity to spend effectively
Government performance not improving Government performance improving 
Low private sector absorptive capacity High private sector absorptive capacity
Adequate public infrastructure and investment Inadequate public infrastructure and investment
High rate of return on foreign investments Low rate of return on foreign investments
Fast depletion rate Slow depletion rate
High risk of negative economic,  
environmental or social crises
Low risk of negative economic,  
environmental or social crises
Low poverty rate High poverty rate
Sustainable public debt path Unsustainable public debt path
Finally, if fiscal rules are too flexible, then they cannot act as an effective commitment  
mechanism linking successive governments’ policies. If they are too rigid, then they will limit 
the government’s ability to respond to changing circumstances or the government will find a  
way around them. It is therefore crucial that they be designed appropriately, there is national 
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Operationalizing fiscal rules for NRFs: Deposit and withdrawal rules
In countries with natural resource funds, fiscal rules are often converted into two sets of opera-
tional rules known as deposit and withdrawal rules. Deposit rules define which oil, gas or mineral 
revenues are deposited into the fund and when. Withdrawal rules define how much revenue can 
be withdrawn from the fund in any given quarter or year and where the money goes. 
Deposit Rules
Deposits are usually made by electronic transfer directly into the fund by the entity bearing the 
payment obligation or they pass through the national revenue authority before being deposited 
into the fund. Which payments are included depends on regulation or legislation. The most  
comprehensive rules require all extractive sector and related payments streams to be deposited. 
The full list can include:
 • Interest on natural resource fund investments
 • Bonuses (including signature, discovery and production bonuses)
 • Royalties (including royalties-in-kind)
 • Profit taxes (including windfall, resource rent, income and production taxes)
 • Sales of “profit oil”
 • Net consumption-based taxes (including excise, fuel and carbon taxes)
 •  Capital gains tax derived from the sale of ownership of exploration, development  
and production rights
 • Withholding taxes
 • Dividends from equity stakes or sales of state property
 • Fees (including development, exploration, license, rental, and concession fees)
 • Production entitlements (by value and volume)
 • Transportation and terminal operations fees
 • Customs duties/import and export levies
 • Fines/penalties paid to government
Commonly, certain streams are excluded. For example, the Alaskan constitution does not  
equire property taxes or income taxes to be deposited into the Alaska Permanent Fund. These two 
payments alone may represent up to two-thirds of petroleum revenue in any given year. Wyoming 
only requires a 2.5 percent excise tax on oil, gas and minerals to be deposited into its Wyoming 
Permanent Mineral Trust Fund. 
Minimum deposits may also be required, especially in jurisdictions with expenditure growth  
or balanced budget rules. Wyoming, for example, must deposit 75 percent of the surplus over  
and above its Spending Policy Amount, which is a limit on expenditure growth. Similarly, Chile 
must deposit all mineral revenue that causes it to exceed the 1-percent-of-GDP-structural-surplus 
limit on spending.  
Some governments also specify which companies are covered. In Kazakhstan, for example, the 
government sets the list of companies whose payments make their way into the National Fund.  
By changing the list every year, it can determine how much revenue is placed in the budget and 
how much is deposited into the fund. In addition, publicly owned companies may be treated  
differently from private companies. Payments from national oil companies (NOCs) or state- 
owned mining companies are usually deposited directly into the fund but may be subject to 
special rules allowing them to retain certain profits. For example, only 10 percent of the Kuwait 
Oil Company’s (KOC) profits are deposited into the Kuwait Investment Authority. The KOC retains 
costs, 50 cents per barrel and revenue from sales to refineries. The remaining amount is trans-
ferred to the government. 
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Policy Brief Other deposit rules specify which stages among exploration, development, production,  
transportation, processing and export are covered. For example, the Timor-Leste revenue  
management legislation specifies payments “from all petroleum operations including prospect-
ing, exploration, development, exploitation, transportation, sale or export of petroleum and  
other related activities.” In contrast, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority simply states that  
deposits “are derived from petroleum revenues.” 
Finally, some natural resource funds require that payments be made from non-extractive as well 
as extractive revenues. For example, proceeds from the sale of agricultural land are deposited into 
the Kazakhstan National Fund.
Withdrawal Rules
Withdrawal rules specify how often withdrawals can be made, where they must go, the amount of 
any transfer and whether they need to be approved by parliament. In terms of timing, withdraw-
als can be limited to a single annual transfer to the treasury (e.g., São Tomé and Príncipe; Trinidad 
and Tobago), limited to quarterly transfers to stabilize the budget (e.g., Ghana), or can be left to the 
discretion of the government (e.g., Brunei). 
Transfers are usually made to the state treasury, though on occasion there are exceptions. The 
Alaska Permanent Fund disbursed just under 50 percent of deposits in any given year directly to 
households in the form of a citizen dividend. Interest from the Texas Permanent University Fund 
is disbursed directly to the University of Texas and Texas A&M University. 
Withdrawals can also be earmarked for development purposes. Withdrawals from Chile’s Pension 
Reserve Fund, not to exceed the fund’s investment returns from the previous year, must finance 
pensions, welfare and social security liabilities. Russia’s National Wealth Fund should be used 
to pay for pension liabilities. Ghana’s oil revenues must finance national development projects. 
Texas Permanent University Fund withdrawals must be spent on specific academic purposes such 
as scholarships, fellowships and student services. And Botswana’s mineral revenues must be 
spent on public investment. Regrettably, earmarking may be ineffectual since money is fungible; 
it is interchangeable with other money so it is rarely possible to monitor and verify compli-
ance. For example, say Botswana collects $10 billion non-resource taxes and spends $1 billion 
on infrastructure. If it collects an additional $1 billion in diamond revenues, this does not mean 
that it will spend $2 billion on infrastructure. Instead, it may simply claim to spend the diamond 
revenue on infrastructure, maintaining the $1 billion infrastructure budget, and shift $1 billion in 
non-resource taxes from infrastructure spending to another line item, such as government wages.
Amounts permitted for withdrawal are usually determined by fiscal rules, which, where they 
exist, are more often than not legislated. In countries with expenditure or balanced budget rules 
(e.g., Botswana, Norway and Chile), withdrawals must not exceed the maximum budget deficit or 
minimum surplus.4 Countries with revenue rules have more varied withdrawal rules. In Trinidad 
and Tobago, for example, where the petroleum revenues collected in any financial year fall below 
the estimated petroleum revenues for that financial year by at least 10 percent, either 60 percent 
of the revenue shortfall or 25 percent of the fund’s balance can be withdrawn, whichever is the 
lesser amount. In Timor-Leste, the amount withdrawn in any given year cannot exceed 3 percent 
of national petroleum wealth, unless justification is provided to parliament. In Ghana, the Ghana 
Stabilization Fund has a different set of withdrawal rules than the Ghana Heritage Fund. In case of 
a greater than 25 percent shortfall in expected petroleum revenue in any given quarter, the lesser 
of either 75 percent of the estimated shortfall or 25 percent of the fund’s balance will be with-
drawn from the Ghana Stabilization Fund. Withdrawals from the Ghana Heritage Fund can only 
4 Norway’s balanced budget rule is a political commitment and has not been legislated.
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be made once oil revenues are depleted and the two funds are merged. At that point, withdrawals 
cannot exceed the interest on the combined fund.
Some countries have specified the conditions under which exceptions to fiscal rules may be made. 
Statutory exceptions allow for flexibility while maintaining the long-term perspective prompted 
by fiscal rules. Timor-Leste, for example, allows for additional withdrawals from the Petroleum 
Fund provided they are justified to parliament. Norway’s fiscal guidelines allow for deviations 
from their fiscal rule when the economy is working well below full capacity and when there are 
large changes in their natural resource fund’s value. Ghana’s parliament reviews the percentage 
split between the Stabilization Fund and the Heritage Fund once every three years. 
While the countries mentioned have comprehensive rules, others’ rules are constantly changing, 
are insufficient or simply do not exist. Kazakhstan, for example, has had three drastically different 
withdrawal rules since 2005, limiting the effectiveness of its fiscal rules as a commitment mecha-
nism.  Russia suspended its long-term non-oil deficit target of 4.7 percent of GDP and resulting 
withdrawal rules for its Reserve Fund in 2009. Abu Dhabi, Azerbaijan and Brunei simply have no 
withdrawal rules. 
Conclusion
Countries rich in nonrenewable resources face a specific set of macroeconomic challenges associ-
ated with their unique nature: Dutch Disease, volatility and exhaustibility. Each in its own way 
can lead to wasteful spending or boom-bust economic cycles. In recognition of this uniqueness, 
many countries have established natural resource funds. However, these funds by themselves 
do not guarantee sound macroeconomic management—just the opposite: They may lead to less 
government accountability.
Fiscal rules are a key set of tools that resource-rich countries can use to promote sound macro-
economic management. They can help mitigate budget volatility, help governments save in case 
of emergency, help mitigate Dutch Disease or help benefit future generations. Most important, 




long-term vision to government financial decisions in the countries that need it most. The  
challenge is in finding the right set of context-specific fiscal rules, generating consensus on  
the rule(s), effectively converting the rule(s) into operational deposit and withdrawal rules,  
and enforcing them.
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Rules-based Investment for  
Natural Resource Funds
Malan Rietveld and Andrew Bauer
Key messages
•  Clear investment rules can enhance natural resource fund investment performance, limit 
excessive risk-taking and help prevent mismanagement of public resources.
•  A fund’s policy objective (e.g., saving resource revenues for the benefit of future generations; 
providing a source of short-term financing to stabilize volatile budgets) should inform its 
target financial return (e.g., 3-5 percent per year), which is an implicit statement of the fund’s 
risk appetite.
•  Most natural resource funds are governed by a set of detailed investment rules that constrain 
investment decisions. These generally include a target asset class allocation (percentage  
of investments in cash, fixed income, equities and alternative assets), restrictions on  
domestic investment, restrictions on risky asset purchases, and restrictions on the use  
of natural resource funds as collateral to guarantee public debt.
•  In practice, there is significant scope for tailoring a natural resource fund’s rules-based 
investment strategy to a country or region’s specific needs, expertise and context. However, a 
large degree of discretion over investments is likely to lead to patronage or mismanagement.
Why are investment rules important?
The governments of resource-rich countries hold approximately $3.3 trillion in foreign assets in 
natural resource funds (NRFs). These assets, purchased with the proceeds from oil, gas and min-
eral extraction and sales, belong to the government and by extension to the citizens of the country 
or region represented by that government. As such, NRF assets ought to be managed in the public 
interest and a fund’s investment objectives narrowly tailored to policy objectives. For savings 
funds, objectives may include generating a high rate of return for the benefit of future generations 
while simultaneously limiting risk in order to protect the public’s endowment.  Investment  
rules might thus require an asset allocation that mixes safer, lower-return investments with 
higher-risk, higher-return investments, while prohibiting the riskiest types of investments (e.g., 
derivatives). In contrast, a stabilization fund requires assets to be turned into cash quickly to 
finance budget deficits. In this case, a rule can be crafted that forces investment managers to  
purchase exclusively or primarily liquid assets (e.g., U.S. Treasury bills). 
Investment rules offer an important means of preventing mismanagement and addressing  
common challenges related to conflicts of interest, lack of managerial capacity and incentives 
rewarding excessive risk-taking. ”Principal-agent” problems, wherein the managers of  
government assets act in accordance with personal rather than public interests, are a common 
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Policy Brief source of conflict of interest. For example, a minister may have an interest in investing in  
businesses owned by his political allies in order to help him stay in power while the public  
interest may, depending on the economic context, favor investments in health and education,  
or in overseas assets for the benefit of future generations or to prevent Dutch Disease. To address 
this issue, most NRFs prohibit domestic investments. 
Lack of managerial capacity to manage funds well or to oversee investment managers can lead  
to large losses. In this case, rules that limit the percentage of fund assets a single investment 
manager may control can help spread the risk of large losses due to misconduct or negligence. 
Similarly, rules can be written to ensure that only qualified managers manage fund investments.
Excessive risk-taking by investment managers can also create challenges. While the executive or 
ministry of finance is usually responsible for overall management of the NRF and sets investment 
policy, and the central bank or an independent agency acts as day-to-day operational manager,  
external managers are often hired to make some or all of the actual investments. Since much of 
their compensation comes from management fees and they can charge higher fees for trading 
more complex, higher-risk financial products, external managers have an incentive to push  
NRFs to invest in risky assets like derivatives.1 While high-risk/high-return investments may  
have a place within even a very conservative private institutional investor’s overall portfolio,  
as custodians of public funds NRF managers have a responsibility to safeguard NRF assets and  
prevent waste or excessive risk-taking. Detailed investment rules, such as those limiting  
purchases of high-risk assets, can help address excessive risk-taking.
The experience of the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) under the Gadhafi regime illustrates the 
risk of failing to address the challenges of conflict of interest, poor managerial capacity and exces-
sive risk-taking. In a prime example of using public funds for personal gain, the LIA invested in 
opaque hedge funds run by friends of the regime, including a $300 million investment in Palladyne 
International Asset Management, a previously unheard-of fund with links to the former chairman 
of Libya’s National Oil Corporation. Despite investing only slightly more than half of these funds, 
Palladyne recorded more than $50 million in losses from 2008 to mid-2010. Many institutional in-
vestors, including NRFs with riskier investment strategies like Norway’s Government Pension Fund 
Global and the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (Canada), lost significant amounts from 2008  
to 2009 due to the global financial crisis. However, most had recovered all their losses by mid-2010. 
Several notable NRFs, including Azerbaijan’s State Oil Fund, Chile’s two funds, Timor-Leste’s  
Petroleum Fund, and Trinidad and Tobago’s Heritage and Stabilization Fund, actually made  
positive returns during the crisis thanks to conservative, low-risk investment approaches.2
Furthermore, the LIA did not carry out its due diligence when taking on risky structured financial 
products sold by investment banks and hedge funds such as Goldman Sachs, Permal and Mil-
lennium Global. For example, Permal was paid $27 million in fees for managing $300 million in 
investments. Rarely do management, transaction or expense fees combined exceed more than a 
few percentage points, much less reach the 9 percent paid to Permal. In a 2010 internal review,  
LIA management wrote, “High fees have been directly responsible for the poor results.”
The LIA also took excessive risks. For example, it invested $1.2 billion in equity and currency  
derivatives managed by Goldman Sachs. That investment lost 98.5 percent of its value by June 
2010 due to the global financial crisis.3
1  Derivatives are financial instruments that derive their value from other assets, indices or interest rates. They include swaps, futures and 
options, and are generally considered high-risk investments.
2  P. Kunzel, Y. Lu, I. Petrova and J. Pihlman, “Investment Objectives of Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Shifting Paradigm,” Economics of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds: Issues for Policymakers (eds. Udaibir S. Das, Adnan Mazarei and Hand van der Hoorn), Washington D.C.: IMF, 2010.
3  Lina Saigol and Cynthia O’Murchu, “After Gadhafi: A Spent Force,” The Financial Times, September 8, 2011. http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/1b5e11b6-d4cb-11e0-a7ac-00144feab49a.html#axzz2PclPUcQK.
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Constraining fund investment choices is an important means of ensuring that NRFs are managed 
in the public interest. Clear investment rules, guidelines and targets guard against taking exces-
sive risk, limit the discretionary power of NRF management, and can significantly enhance the 
transparency and effective monitoring of NRF actions, strategies and performance. This paper 
describes the policy options for a rules-based investment regime. We discuss setting investment 
goals and a target return that are consistent with NRF policy objectives. We then go into some 
detail on specific investment rules, notably setting a target asset class allocation, benchmarking, 
restrictions on specific types of investments, and restrictions on the use of NRFs for raising public 
debt. We close with a discussion of portfolio rebalancing.
Setting investment goals and a target return
Natural resource funds may be designed to address one or several of the following objectives:4
•  Savings: Funds may be used to transform natural resources into financial assets and invest 
them to generate a long-lasting source of government revenue for the benefit of future gen-
erations (e.g., Botswana’s Pula Fund; Chile’s Pension Reserve Fund; the Kuwait Investment 
Authority; Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global; Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund).
•  Stabilization: Funds may cover budget deficits caused by unexpected declines in oil or  
mineral revenues (e.g., Chile’s Economic and Social Stabilization Fund; Timor-Leste’s  
Petroleum Fund; Wyoming Permanent Mineral Trust Fund).
•  Fiscal sterilization: Large sales of oil, gas or minerals draw foreign currency into the  
country, which can generate inflation or exchange rate appreciation and subsequently harm 
the economy. Proceeds of natural resource extraction can be invested in foreign assets to  
help mitigate these effects (e.g., Saudi Arabia’s SAMA Foreign Holdings).
•  Development: Natural resource revenues may be earmarked for specific expenditures, such 
as health, education or direct cash transfers (e.g., Alaska’s Permanent Fund; Texas’ Permanent 
University Fund).
•  Ring-fencing: Since they are a national endowment and exhaustible, oil, gas and mineral 
revenues may be treated separately by the government and subject to a higher degree of 
transparency and oversight than other revenues (e.g., Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund).
Investment goals often follow from fund objectives. While fund objectives are statements of fund 
purpose, the investment goals are statements of investment strategies that should be aligned with 
those objectives. For example, Chile’s Pension Reserve Fund is essentially a savings fund and, as 
such, has a long-term investment horizon. To reflect this, its investment goal is “maximizing  
the expected return subject to a (clearly defined) risk tolerance.” For Chile’s Economic and Social  
Stabilization Fund, which must hold liquid assets to cover its short-term budget financing  
obligations, it is “maximizing the fund’s accumulated value in order to partially cover cyclical 
reductions in fiscal revenues while maintaining a low level of risk.”5 
4  While most funds have explicit stated objectives, some may behave differently from their intended purpose. For example, the stated  
objective of the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (Canada) is long-term savings. However, since the government is not obliged by a 
fiscal rule to make payments into the fund and has taken a short-term perspective on fiscal policy, little has been deposited over the last 
decade, despite historically high oil prices.
5 Ministry of Finance, Chile, “About the Funds.” http://www.hacienda.cl/english/sovereign-wealth-funds/about-the-funds.html.
Revenue Watch Institute
62
Policy Brief Investment goals are simply general policy statements. To operationalize them, they are often 
expressed as an explicit target return (e.g., a long-run real return of 3 percent annually). While  
it may seem counterintuitive, most NRFs start with a targeted percentage return and work from  
that figure toward an articulation of risk appetite (tolerance for short-term volatility, losses and  
illiquidity), rather than the reverse.6 In a sense, the target return is an implicit statement about 
risk tolerance; the higher the target, generally the greater the probability of price volatility, the 
less the liquidity, the longer the maturity or the larger the potential losses.7 Most institutional 
investors make their target return explicit, although NRFs have not universally used this practice. 
Historically, the real return target (after accounting for the effects of inflation) of most long-term 
institutional investors has been around 4-6 percent per annum. An independent study com-
missioned by the Norwegian government to evaluate its NRF against global peers found that the 
peer group (consisting of various long-term investment funds) had a median target return of 5 
percent per annum.8 The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global has a real return target 
of 4 percent. The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) has a “target rate of return and a risk profile 
that would seek to enable KIA to double asset-under-management within ten years,” which equals 
a 7.2 percent compound annual growth rate.9 Alaska’s Permanent Fund targets a long-run real 
return of 5 percent.10
In practice, NRFs with a savings and investment purpose will typically have a higher target return 
than stabilization funds. This is because the former has a longer investment horizon and greater 
tolerance for risk (periodic volatility) than stabilization funds with short investment horizons, 
little appetite for volatility and a much greater need to hold liquid assets. Funds that have more 
of a developmental purpose tend to place less emphasis on target returns, although they express 
some long-run expected return criteria for domestic infrastructure investments. 
Detailed investment rules
Most natural resource funds are governed by a set of detailed investment rules that constrain 
investment decisions. In practice these rules may be articulated in petroleum or mineral revenue 
management legislation (e.g., Ghana’s Petroleum Revenue Management Act or Timor-Leste’s  
Petroleum Fund Law) and/or in an NRF’s investment guidelines, investment mandate or invest-
ment policy documents (e.g., Chile’s Pension Reserve Fund Investment Guidelines or Norway’s 
Management Mandate for the Government Pension Fund Global). The following elaborates on the 
more common rules.
Asset Allocation
The single most important decision an NRF’s overseers and operational managers will make in 
terms of the fund’s long-run risk and return characteristics is the specification of its strategic 
asset allocation. An investor’s strategic asset allocation is its long-run target allocation to various 
asset classes, each of which has its own risk-return characteristics (shown in Figure 1):
 •  Cash: Highly liquid and low-risk, low-return assets such as money market instruments 
(e.g., short-term government bonds)  and bank deposits 
6 Liquidity is the ability to turn an asset into cash immediately.
7  Expected return is a function of risk—financial instruments and asset classes that are more volatile, less liquid and have longer maturities 
generally have higher expected returns. Investors are compensated for bearing these risks. Therefore, the target return is implicitly (and 
sometimes explicitly) a statement of the fund’s risk appetite. For instance, for some truly long-term investors, such as university endow-
ments with highly diversified portfolios, the real return target can be as high as 10 percent. But these funds’ tolerance for short-term 
volatility, holding illiquid assets and assuming a long-term investment horizon is greater than for investors with lower target returns. 
8  “Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global Investment Benchmarking Results,” CEM Benchmarking, 2012.  
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/2012/GPFG_2010_investment_benchmarking.pdf.
9  Kuwait Investment Authority, “Overview of the Kuwait Investment Authority.”  
http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/About_KIA/Objective_Strategy/Pages/default.aspx.
10  Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, “Investments.” http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/investments/investIndex2009.cfm.
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Figure 1: 
The Risk-Return Profile  
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 •  Fixed income/bonds: Other debt instruments with slightly more risk and return  
(e.g., investment-grade government or corporate bonds)
 
 •  Equities: Stocks in companies with varying degrees of risk and return
 •  Alternative assets: More volatile and complex assets with higher long-run expected  
returns, such as real estate, infrastructure, derivatives and private equity11
Research suggests that more than 90 percent of the variation in investment performance over 
time is explained by strategic asset allocation.12 Asset allocation is generally a “top-down”  
decision made by the executive or through legislation, as opposed to a “bottom-up” approach 
where changes are made by day-to-day operational managers based on market prices. In some 
cases, asset allocation decisions may also rest with the operational manager, but they will always 
need approval from some legislative or executive authority, such as parliament and/or a minis-
ter. Asset allocation should be a medium- to long-term decision that requires extensive research 
and consultation between stakeholders; typically an NRF’s strategic asset allocation will only be 
reviewed every two to four years and is often left unchanged at these intervals. 
A fund’s asset allocation is directly derived from its purpose, investment objective and target  
return. A more risk-averse investor, with shorter horizons and a high preference (or need) for 
liquid assets, would favor a relatively higher allocation to bonds and cash (or money market 
instruments). A stabilization fund for example, needs access to funds at short notice to stabilize 
fiscal revenues in the event of anticipated shocks in commodity prices and cannot afford sharp 
fluctuations in the value of its portfolio. Stabilization funds would therefore want to avoid  
investing in volatile assets (e.g., listed equities) and illiquid assets (e.g., alterative or private  
assets, such as private equity and real estate). 
11  The term “alternative assets” covers many different types of assets, the common characteristic being that they are traded in private,  
not public, markets. Some of these assets have higher risk-return characteristics.
12  R. Ibbotson and P. Kaplan, “Does Asset Allocation Policy Explain 40, 90, or 100 Percent of Performance?” Financial Analysts Journal, 2000, 
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Policy Brief In contrast, a long-term savings fund would be able to afford some degree of volatility and  
illiquidity and could therefore adopt a more diversified, higher-risk portfolio. In practice, how-
ever, many savings funds choose to invest in a smaller set of asset classes, for at least two reasons. 
First, public authorities lack the expertise to engage in complex trading operations. Second, it is 
often politically unfeasible to incur the occasional losses that inevitably come with investing in 
higher-risk, more volatile alternative assets.
Chile’s Pension Reserve Fund, for example, invests only in bonds and equities despite being a 
long-term savings fund, though it has a high degree of diversification within those two asset 
classes. With the bond portfolio, the fund has allocations to nominal and inflation-linked sov-
ereign bonds as well as agency and corporate debt. Its equities investments are in global stocks, 
which means the fund has a very large degree of geographic diversity in its equity portfolio. 
It is interesting to note that the fund made small changes to its strategic asset allocation in 2012 
from the one that applied since its inception in 2007. The fund reduced its holdings of sovereign 
bonds, completely moved out of money market instruments, and made first-time allocations 
to equities and corporate bonds. The change to the strategic asset allocation, shown in Figure 2, 
was made because the Ministry of Finance and the fund’s management felt that the fund had the 
required risk appetite to allocate part of the portfolio to more risky asset classes, such as corporate 
bonds and equities, in order to generate a higher long-run return. The fund’s 2011 annual report 
stated that the new strategic asset allocation was “more in line with the return objectives and risk 
profile” of the fund and “more consistent with the underlying liability that needs to be financed 
in the future.”13
The asset allocation of Chile’s Economic and Social Stabilization Fund is naturally much more 
conservative, given its need for low risk and liquid assets. Consequently, it invests 66.5 percent in 
sovereign bonds, 30 percent in money market instruments and 3.5 percent in inflation-protected 
bonds, whose interest payments are not fixed but rather rise and fall with changes in the inflation 
rate (see Figure 3). 
13 Ministry of Finance, Chile, Sovereign Wealth Funds Annual Report 2011.
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One way of ensuring that investment managers manage well within the constraints imposed 
on them by the asset class allocation is to select a series of benchmarks for each asset class. The 
benchmark is usually an index that reflects market performance so that the government and 
oversight bodies can measure investment manager performance against a market average, thus 
improving manager accountability.
Benchmark indexes help explain why returns may be high or low for any given period. For  
example, if the fund is down 5 percent over a period that the benchmark is down 5.6 percent,  
the investment performance may be deemed satisfactory. In contrast, if the fund is up 8 percent 
over a period that the benchmark returned 13 percent, investment performance may be deemed 
unsatisfactory (or at least require some detailed explanation). 
Strategic asset allocation Benchmarks
Asset class Percent of total
Nominal sovereign 
bonds and related 
assets
48% Barclays Capital Global Aggregate: Treasury Bond Index (unhedged)
Barclays Capital Global Aggregate: Government-Related (unhedged)
Inflation-indexed  
sovereign bonds
17% Barclays Capital Global Inflation-Linked Index (unhedged)
Corporate bonds 20% Barclays Capital Global Aggregate: Corporate Bond Index (unhedged)
Equities 15% MSCI All Country World Index (unhedged with reinvested dividends)
In practice, NRFs disclose varying degrees of detail around their benchmarks. The NRFs of Alaska 
(USA), Alberta (Canada), Azerbaijan, Chile, Kazakhstan and Norway make detailed disclosures, not 
only of the benchmarks for each asset class but also of the funds’ historic track record in manag-
ing funds relative to those benchmarks (see Table 4 for Chilean strategic allocation and bench-
marks). Other NRFs, such as the Kuwait Investment Authority and Botswana’s Pula Fund, provide 
some disclosures around the benchmarks they have selected for their funds but little information 
on the fund’s actual investment performance relative to the benchmark.
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Policy Brief Like nearly all NRFs, the Chilean Pension Reserve Fund primarily takes a “passive approach” to 
investing, meaning that the fund’s internal and external managers need to closely follow their 
respective benchmarks. The fund is not allowed to deviate from the benchmark by more than 0.5 
percent on its sovereign bond portfolio, 0.3 percent on its equity portfolio and 0.5 percent on its 
corporate bond portfolio. 
The main implication of sticking very closely to a benchmark is that it forces investment manag-
ers to “follow the market” rather than invest counter-cyclically by buying certain assets when 
their prices are falling and selling when their prices are rising. In order to outperform the bench-
mark by some margin, some funds use external private-sector managers to try to add some degree 
of value through active management—external managers are given a benchmark and some  
degree of flexibility in deviating from it in order to generate additional returns over the market. 
In practice, however, most NRFs only allow small deviations around conservative benchmarks 
(relatively small tracking errors). Only a very few, such as the Libyan Investment Authority under 
the Gadhafi regime, or the Kuwait Investment Authority, engage mainly in active management.14
Eligible Assets and Permitted Trading Strategies
An important part of a rules-based investment strategy is clear and unambiguous guidelines stat-
ing which asset classes (e.g., equities, fixed income, real estate) the NRF can invest in and which 
trading strategies the NRF is and is not permitted to use. This involves a trade-off between giving 
investment managers higher degrees of flexibility (and the ability to potentially generate higher 
returns) and the avoidance of certain financial instruments that are deemed too risky or complex 
(such as certain derivatives and structured financial instruments).
From an oversight and governance perspective, this decision requires careful consideration of 
whether the fund has the technical capacity to adopt complex investment practices. If they are 
well understood and carefully monitored, complex instruments and strategies, such as deriva-
tives, leverage and short-selling, can help manage risks and enhance returns. However, very often 
they introduce significant operational and default risk, incur high management fees and become 
tools for excessive speculation. 
Countries with NRFs employ several different types of detailed constraints on investments:
 •  Restrictions on domestic investment: With very few exceptions (Azerbaijan; Iran),  
natural resource funds are explicitly prohibited from investing in domestic assets. There 
are at least three reasons why. First, investing in the country would undermine any fiscal 
sterilization objective. In countries like Botswana, Chile, Norway, Timor-Leste and  
Trinidad and Tobago,  policymakers have argued either that the domestic market is too 
small to absorb all resource revenues or that resource revenues needed to be placed out-
side the country in order to reduce pressure of the local currency to appreciate or cause 
inflation, thereby aggravating the Dutch Disease. Second, spending directly out of the 
natural resource fund could lead to bypassing the normal budget process. This could result 
in inconsistencies with the budget and circumvention of controls and safeguards such as 
project appraisal, public tendering and project monitoring. Third, spending directly out of 
the natural resource fund could bypass parliamentary, auditor, media or citizen oversight. 
As a result, funds can become an easy source of patronage or financing for investments 
that support the political goals of fund managers. 
14  Wharton Leadership Center (2010), The Brave New World of Sovereign Wealth Funds. http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
papers/download/052810_Lauder_Sovereign_Wealth_Fund_report_2010.pdf. 
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 •  Minimum credit rating: The Investment guidelines or revenue management law may 
specify minimum credit ratings for debt instruments that carry default risk. The major 
rating agencies, Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, all rate the credit quality (risk of 
default) of borrowers—the countries, companies and agencies who issue bonds and other 
debt instruments that NRFs invest in. Many NRFs are only allowed to buy bonds issued 
by borrowers with “Investment Grade” or “A- or higher” ratings from at least two of the 
major ratings agencies. This ensures that risk of default by the NRF’s debtors is kept very 
low (although this also reduces returns). The same principles apply to the management 
of credit or default risk among the NRF’s counterparties—the banks and custodians that 
trade and hold the NRF’s assets. For example, the investment guidelines or NRF law may 
specify that transactions are only allowed with intermediaries that have a high credit rat-
ing, implying low risk of default. The Norwegian Government Pension Fund has mandated 
that “counterparties for unsecured deposits shall have a long-term credit rating of at least 
AA-/Aa3/AA- from at least one of the following three agencies: Fitch, Moody’s or Standard 
& Poor’s.”15
 •  Restrictions on private market instruments: Publicly traded instruments—stocks and 
bonds that are traded on public exchanges—have features that are desirable from a trans-
parency and risk perspective. They can always be priced (their value can be determined at 
any point in time, because buyers and sellers interact through public exchanges to deter-
mine prices), trading volumes are much higher (so that there are always buyers and sellers 
for marketable securities), and there is no risk that a counterparty or investment partner 
will default. In practice, NRFs may look to start trading only in public assets and only 
gradually make allocations to private assets. The Norwegian Government Pension Fund 
Global, for example, made its first allocation to private assets (real estate) in 2011, almost 
two decades after the fund’s inception. The Ministry of Finance, which oversees the fund, 
argued that the fund should target a maximum allocation to real estate of 5 percent of the 
overall portfolio (although by the end of 2012, only 0.7 percent had been allocated to real 
estate, given the long lead times associated with these investments).16
 •  Restrictions on other high-risk instruments: Over-the-counter currency derivatives  
(futures, options) can help protect a portfolio against unwanted risks for exchange rate 
movements, if they are well understood and are used appropriately. But they also intro-
duce bilateral counterparty risk because they are traded between two financial institutions 
rather than on an exchange and are often relatively complex and opaque. The key consid-
erations for authorizing the use of derivatives are whether the fund has the requisite  
technical knowledge to understand the risks and obligations associated with these  
contracts and whether the investment guidelines ensure that the derivatives are being 
used for hedging (insurance) rather than speculative purposes. 
 •  Currency restrictions: Some countries restrict investments to assets denominated in 
convertible currencies or specific currencies. For example, Botswana’s Pula Fund makes 
fixed income investments denominated in only convertible currencies, mainly the U.S. 
dollar, the Euro, pound sterling and yen. Chile’s Economic and Social Stabilization Fund 
has a currency allocation of 50 percent in US dollars, 40 percent in Euros and 10 percent 
in yen. The rationale for this type of rule is that assets denominated in convertible and 
abundantly traded currencies can be traded or turned into cash relatively quickly. 
15  Norges Bank Investment Management, “Investment Mandate,” September 2, 2009.  
http://www.norges-bank.no/Upload/77273/4_mandate.pdf.
16 Norges Bank Investment Management, Government Pension Fund Global Annual Report 2012.
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 •  Restrictions on using the fund as collateral on general government debt: A multi-
billion-dollar natural resource fund can be used to secure government loans. In brief, the 
government can promise creditors that if it defaults on its debt, the NRF assets can be used 
to pay them back. This is particularly useful for credit-constrained governments, those 
that are charged high interest rates or those that have been locked out of international 
financial markets because of weak government finances. However, this strategy also puts 
natural resource revenues at risk, especially if the government has a tendency to default.  
It also encourages overborrowing. 
   In the past, governments in Algeria, Cameroon and Venezuela have used their oil revenues 
as collateral and borrowed excessively, only to face debt crises when oil prices and revenues 
declined. A similar trend is occurring today in countries like Kazakhstan, despite histori-
cally high oil prices. One solution has been to restrict either part of all of a natural resource 
fund from being used as collateral. For example, the Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund used to be 
prohibited from being used as a guarantee on public debt. Currently 10 percent of the Fund 
may be used as collateral. This reduces interest rates on loans yet protects 90 percent of the 
fund from any potential consequences of poor public financial management.
 •  Restrictions on taking on debt: Most NRFs are prohibited from using leverage, meaning 
that they cannot use fund assets to borrow money to purchase additional assets. While 
using leverage may increase financial returns, it also creates a risk that the additional 
investment will lose money, risking not only that asset but also additional fund principal 
required to pay off creditors. These restrictions essentially prevent managers from risking 
large losses on public funds.
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Portfolio rebalancing
A final rule that applies to NRFs with long-term investment horizons and a diversified portfolio 
(i.e., the fund invests in a mix of asset classes) relates to rebalancing the portfolio. Over time, the 
divergent performance of the various asset classes in the NRF’s portfolio will mean that its effec-
tive asset allocation drifts away from its strategic asset allocation. For example, if a fund decided 
on an allocation of 60 percent in equities and 40 percent in bonds at the start of a five-year period, 
and stocks then significantly outperformed bonds over that period, the fund’s effective allocation 
at the end of period would be more than 60 percent in equities (due to faster capital growth in the 
equity portfolio). 
The process of rebalancing ensures that the fund’s overall portfolio is periodically returned to its 
target long-term strategic asset allocation. In practice, there are a number of technical consider-
ations to take into account in the process of portfolio rebalancing. For example, how often should 
the fund rebalance, and should rebalancing be done at certain time intervals or should it be based 
on upper or lower limits for particular asset classes? Rebalancing rules have long been associated 
with sound risk management and the generation of higher long-run returns for long-term inves-
tors. A number of NRFs have clear and transparent rebalancing rules that form a key part of their 
overall investment strategy. 
In its annual report for 2012, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global disclosed  
extensive information around its rebalancing rule. It is expressed as follows:
  “The rule specifies a limit for how far the equity allocation in the benchmark index may  
deviate from the strategic allocation before rebalancing must be performed. The limit is set  
at 4 percentage points, which means that if the equity allocation in the benchmark index 
is less than 56 percent or more than 64 percent at the end of a calendar month, it will be 
returned to 60 percent at the end of the following month.”17
The fund stated that its rebalancing rule was a “strategy that mechanically buys shares after prices 
have fallen, and sells following an upsurge in prices”—that is, the fund has a rule that forces  
it to go against the current in the markets and buy stocks when most investors are selling (and 
vice versa). 
Conclusion
Investment rules have a disciplining effect on internal and external portfolio managers. If 
properly communicated and disclosed, the fund’s investment rules contribute in a meaningful 
way to the governance, transparency and accountability of a NRF and, most important, promote 
understanding and agreement between oversight bodies, the fund’s management and members 
of society around what the fund is expected and able to do. In practice, there is significant scope 
for tailoring the rules-based investment strategy of a natural resource fund to the specific needs, 
expertise and context of each country or region. However, a large degree of discretion is likely to 
lead to patronage or mismanagement.
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Natural Resource Fund Transparency
Perrine Toledano and Andrew Bauer
Key messages
•  Transparency is a prerequisite for government accountability. It can also help make government 
more efficient, help prevent fiscal crises, and improve policy coherence. Finally, it can improve 
the private investment climate and help build trust between a government and the public. 
•  Natural resource fund transparency can be defined as clear roles and responsibilities  
for managers and policymakers, publicly available information, open decision-making  
processes, reporting and assurances of accurate information.
•  Most of the 24 government signatories of the Santiago Principles, a set of voluntary good  
governance and transparency standards for sovereign wealth funds, have improved their 
funds’ transparency over the past several years.
•  Among the funds reviewed, the Alaskan (USA), Chilean, Ghanaian, Norwegian, Texan  
(USA) and Timor-Leste funds are characterized by a high degree of transparency. Most funds  
in the Middle East and North Africa are not, which has sometimes resulted in serious  
mismanagement of public resources.
•  This paper provides a checklist of key transparency provisions for natural resource funds.
What is natural resource fund transparency?
Transparency, broadly defined, is “the degree to which information is available to outsiders 
that enables them to have informed voice in decisions and/or to assess the decisions made by 
insiders.”1 In terms of natural resource fund governance, transparency involves:2
 a)  Clear roles and responsibilities: The roles and responsibilities of the national govern-
ment, central bank, fund managers and oversight bodies (e.g., independent regulator; 
parliament; auditor; civil society), as well as the relationships among these institutions, 
should be clearly defined.
 b)  Publicly available information: Legal freedom of information and easy access to  
information on managerial activities, financial flows in and out of funds, specific assets 
and returns on investments are key elements of natural resource fund transparency.  
The government should make receipts, audits and reports on all financial flows publicly  
available in an easy-to-digest format.
1  Ann Florini.“Introduction: The Battle over Transparency,” in The Right to Know: Transparency for an Open World, ed. Ann Florini  
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 1.
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Policy Brief  c)  Open decision-making processes and reporting: As the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) states, “The government needs to give assurances to the general public that resource 
revenues are being used effectively to meet social and economic policy goals … Savings or 
stabilization funds, while sometimes seen as necessary, should be an integral part of the 
overall fiscal policy framework. Their asset holdings should be fully disclosed and asset 
management policies open.”3
 d)  Assurances of integrity: Data should meet accepted criteria of quality—for example, via 
independent external high quality audits—and there should be oversight mechanisms in 
place that ensure accountability to the public. 
Why is natural resource fund transparency important? 
Transparency of natural resource funds promotes:4 
 a)  Sustainability: Fund transparency aligns public expectations with government objectives—
ensuring, for example, that withdrawals should be based on a consistently applied rule or 
public funds should not be used in the private interest. As such, transparency can encour-
age long-run policy consistency and help manage public expectations over time. Based 
on an examination of natural resource funds by the Revenue Watch Institute and the Vale 
Columbia Center, there is a clear correlation between the degree of fund transparency and 
compliance with a fiscal anchor over the medium to long term.
 b)  More efficient public financial management: An improvement in the quality of data 
a government gathers and maintains can make the jobs of ministries, parliaments and 
regulatory agencies easier. Oversight bodies can also scrutinize fund performance and dis-
tribution of funds and benchmark against other countries or past performance to suggest 
governance improvements. For example, disclosure of returns by specific investment can 
help oversight bodies identify poor investment strategies in order to correct them.
 c)  Fiscal crisis prevention: Policymakers can respond to changing economic conditions  
or mismanagement of funds earlier and easier if they have free access to credible  
information about fund behavior.
 d)  Investor confidence and easier access to capital: Investors are more likely to invest in a 
jurisdiction where policymaking is predictable and they have access to information on the 
risks involved in investing. 
 e)  Trust: Citizens can only feel confident about a government’s spending and investment 
decisions if they are informed. Trust, in turn, can reduce the incidence of social and  
political conflict. 
 f)  Accountability: A well-informed public or oversight bodies with the capacity to act can 
engage in a constructive discussion around policy formulation and fund performance. 
Through public scrutiny, officials can be deterred from acting unethically and held  
accountable for abuses of power for private gain. Governments can also be held  
accountable for their commitments, such as using natural resource funds for budget  
stabilization or savings purposes.
3 IMF, Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency (2007).
4  This list draws on the IMF’s Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency and the Open Society Foundations’ (OSF) Follow the Money:  
A Guide to Monitoring Budgets and Oil and Gas Revenues, which can be found at http://www.revenuewatch.org/training/resource_center/
follow-money-guide-monitoring-budgets-and-oil-and-gas-revenues.
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In addition, the 24 nation-state members of the International Forum on Sovereign Wealth  
Funds (IFSWF) have agreed to a voluntary set of principles and practices for sovereign wealth 
funds known as the Santiago Principles.5 These principles, adopted in 2008, emerged from two 
fears: First, countries receiving Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) investments worried that large 
government investors might use their financial power to pursue political or strategic objectives 
rather than purely financial returns. Second, since SWFs are large—by one definition, global SWF 
assets in 2009 totaled $5.9 trillion of which $3.7 trillion was invested abroad—and growing in 
size, failure of one of the largest SWFs could trigger a global financial crisis.
The 24 voluntary principles are broken down into three sets of standards: legal framework, objec-
tives and coordination with macroeconomic policies; institutional and governance structure; 
and investment and risk management framework. They are meant to encourage SWFs to behave 
openly and predictably and to seek financial returns rather than support a foreign policy agenda. 
Openness, predictability and market orientation, in turn, are expected to ease recipient country 
fears of predatory investments and promote sound internal fund management. 
Being a member of the IFSWF and agreeing to the Santiago Principles provides an incentive to publish 
key information, make clear the roles and responsibilities of key bodies and make decisions openly. 
Though the principles are voluntary, peer pressure and a desire to be perceived in a good light by the 
international community and by recipients of SWF investments can encourage compliance. In fact, 
there is evidence that belonging to the IFSWF may have a positive effect on fund transparency and 
governance. A comparison of Truman SWF Scoreboard scores shows that members of IFSWF in 
2012 improved their fund scores by 17 percent on average between 2007 and 2012, whereas those 
who were not members improved by only 5 percent on average.6 On the other hand, countries who 
are members of the IFSWF but who do not comply with the majority of the principles, such as Qatar 
and the United Arab Emirates, may undermine their own international credibility. 
Country experiences with natural resource fund transparency 
In an ideal setting, natural resource funds serve one or many of the following macroeconomic or 
governance objectives: smoothing budget expenditures, saving for future generations, sterilizing 
capital inflows, safeguarding resource revenues or earmarking resource revenues for specific 
domestic investments. Perhaps the most effective means of achieving these objectives is to codify 
fiscal and governance rules, develop internal mechanisms and capacity to follow these rules and 
manage funds, and empower oversight bodies to ensure compliance with the rules. 
Transparency can support each of these steps. Norway, for example, has not legislated fiscal rules; 
rather, the major political parties have agreed to a fiscal rule by consensus. This political commit-
ment to its fiscal rule works because the country has a stable and democratic political system with 
a high degree of government and parliamentary transparency. The public, media, civil society 
and other oversight bodies, such as the Supervisory Council, rely on information provided by the 
government to determine if the government is abiding by its own rules. To guarantee this safe-
guard, principles of public access to information and reporting are enshrined in the management 
mandate of the Government Pension Fund Global.
5  As of April 2013, the members of IFSWF are Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Canada, Chile, China, Equatorial Guinea, Iran,  
Ireland, Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Singapore, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, the 
United Arab Emirates and the United States.
6  The Truman SWF Scoreboard is an independent assessment of the accountability and transparency of sovereign wealth funds.  




While transparency can support 
good governance and macroeconomic 
management, opacity can create 
an enabling environment for 
mismanagement and arbitrary 
withdrawals of public funds for 
political or private purposes.
Natural Resource Fund Transparency
75
In recognition of the benefits of transparency, jurisdictions such as Alaska (USA), Chile, Ghana, 
Norway, Texas (USA) and Timor-Leste have legislated or regulated a high degree of natural  
resource fund transparency (see Box 1 for some of Alaska’s transparency and reporting rules). 
They all report regularly to the public on: 
 • the size of their funds 
 • fund managers
 • significant fund activities and transactions
 • deposit and withdrawal amounts 
 • returns on investments
 • types of assets permitted for investments, and
 • types of assets they invest in (e.g., fixed income; equities)
All but Ghana also disclose the location of investments, the currency composition of investments 
and the names of specific investments. 
Box 1: Alaska’s Transparency and Reporting Rules (sample)
Public Access to Information: 
“Information in the possession of the corporation is a public record, except that information that 
discloses the particulars of the business or affairs of a private enterprise or investor is confidential 
and is not a public record.” (Alaska Law. Sec. 37.13.200)
Reports and Publications: 
The board is to produce an annual report of the fund by September 30 of each year that includes 
(Alaska Law. Sec. 37.13.170):
 a)  Financial statements audited by independent outside auditors
 b)  Statement of the amount of money received by the fund from each investment during the 
period covered by the report
 c) Comparison of the fund performance with the intended goals
 d) Examination of the effect of the investment criteria on the fund portfolio
 e) Recommendations on changes to policy
While transparency can support good governance and macroeconomic management, opacity can 
create an enabling environment for mismanagement and arbitrary withdrawals of public funds 
for political or private purposes. The Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) is an illuminating case. 
During the Gadhafi era, the fund invested billions of dollars in risky assets managed by political 
friends or allies, racking up billions in losses. For example, it lost $1.18 billion out of a $1.2 billion 
Goldman Sachs–managed derivatives investment in 2010. In another egregious example, the LIA 
paid $27 million in fees on a $300 million investment with Permal, a fund manager, only to lose 
$120 million on the deal.7
The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), Sudan’s Oil Revenue Stabilization Account, Qatar Invest-
ment Authority (QIA), and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority each keep information on fund 
inflows and outflows opaque. The KIA, for instance, only presents asset allocation and rates of 
return to the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers and the National Assembly without making the reports 
public. It is therefore impossible for the Kuwaiti public to know whether the nation’s resources 
are being well managed.




Policy Brief Similarly, the KIA claims to have developed robust internal ethical standards, procedures and 
codes conduct. However, the KIA’s adherence to these standards is unknown due to its lack of 
transparency. In fact, the disclosure of information regarding the KIA’s work is prohibited. Article 
8 of Law 47 (1982) states that, “The members of the Board of Directors, the employees of the 
Authority (KIA) or any of those participating in any form in its activities, may not disclose data or 
information about their work or the position of the invested assets.” Clause 9 lays out penalties 
for any individual who discloses unauthorized information. 
The lack of available information presents a major obstacle to assessing whether the investment 
authority complies with the fund’s rules and objectives. We do know, however, that the govern-
ment has trouble controlling inflation when oil revenues increase and Kuwaiti fiscal policy is 
extremely pro-cyclical (characterized by government exacerbating boom-bust cycles). And in  
2007 a parliamentary committee charged that a relative of KIA Director Bader Al-Saad received 
financing from funds held by the KIA.8 Although these allegations have not been proved, the lack 
of transparency prevents further investigation.
That said, there are certain cases in which, despite a lack of transparency, fiscal policy objectives 
have been met. For example, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency ranks 18th and the QIA ranks 
21st out of 23 natural resource funds scored by RWI’s Resource Governance Index in 2013. The QIA 
ranks dead last out of 53 sovereign wealth funds on Edwin Truman’s SWF Scoreboard accountabil-
ity and transparency indicators.9 Neither the Saudi Arabian nor the Qatari governments publicly 
disclose any management rules (e.g., deposit rules or withdrawal rules) or audited financial state-
ments. In both, the Supreme Council/Councils of Ministers makes decisions regarding fund man-
agement secretly. Yet Qatar and Saudi Arabia have smoothed budget expenditure reasonably well 
and have saved hundreds of billions of dollars of petroleum revenues for future generations.10 It is 
impossible to know whether public funds are being mismanaged within these institutions.
Making a natural resource fund more transparent
Drawing on the Santiago Principles, the Truman SWF Scoreboard indicators and the RWI Revenue 
Management Assessment Toolkit (unpublished), the following is a checklist of key transparency 
provisions for natural resource funds:
Governance
 •  Natural resource fund objectives are clear and denoted in legislation, regulation or  
government policies
 •  Natural resource fund relationship to the budget is clear and denoted in legislation,  
regulation or government policies
 •  Deposit rules are clearly denoted in legislation, regulation or a government policy  
document, including the types of payments to be deposited and the source of payments 
(e.g., kinds of companies)
 •  Withdrawal rules are clearly denoted in legislation, regulation or a government policy 
document, including timing, approval process, conditions for withdrawal and revenue 
forecasting assumptions
 •  Natural resource fund managers are subject to a code of conduct and ethical standards
 •  The roles and relationships between the executive, legislature, fund operator and fund 
manager are clear
8 “Central Bank, KIA Come under Fire,” Kuwait Times, June 20, 2007.
9  Edwin M. Truman, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Threat or Salvation? (Washington, D.C.: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International  
Economics, 2010).
10  Andrew Bauer and Juan Carlos Quiroz, “Resource Governance,” in The Wiley Handbook of Global Energy Policy, ed. Andreas Goldthau  
(Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 244.
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Investments
 • The natural resource fund reports at least annually on:
   • The size of the fund
   • Returns on investments
   • Geographic location of investments
   • Categories of investments (e.g., fixed income; equities)
   • Specific investments
   • Currency composition of investments
 • Investment strategy is clearly stated, including risk profile or qualifying instruments
 • Guidelines for corporate responsibility and ethical investments are public
 • Fund managers’ names are published
Oversight (see paper on Independent Oversight for more on oversight and accountability)
 • The roles and powers of oversight bodies are clear
 • An oversight body such as the legislature approves all withdrawals
 • Quarterly reports are published
 •  An external and independent auditor publishes or certifies an annual report  
and financial statement 





Assessing Oil, Gas and Mineral Revenue Management: An Advocate’s Toolkit (Revenue Watch  
Institute, 2012) (unpublished).
Behrendt, Sven. (2010) “Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Santiago Principles:  
Where Do They Stand?” (Carnegie Papers, 2010). http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ 
santiago_principles.pdf. 
Behrendt, Sven. “Sovereign Wealth Funds and Their Commitment to the ‘Santiago Principles’:  
The Santiago Compliance Index 2011” (Geoeconomica Briefing, 2011). http://geoeconomica.com/
index.php/newsreader-9/items/the-santiago-principles.html.  
Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency (International Monetary Fund, 2007).  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/101907g.pdf.
Heuty, Antoine. “The Role of Transparency and Civil Society in Managing Commodities for  
Inclusive Growth and Development.” In Commodity Price Shocks and Inclusive Growth in  
Low-Income Countries, eds. Arezki, A., C. Pattillo, M. Quintyn and M. Zhu). (International  
Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., 2012).
Santiago Principles (IWGSWF, 2008). http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm. 
Shultz, Jim. Follow the Money: A Guide to Monitoring Budgets and Oil and Gas Revenues (New York: 
Open Society Foundations, 2005).
Truman, Edwin. Sovereign Wealth Funds: Is Asia Different? (IIE Working Paper 11–12, 2011).  
http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp11-12.pdf. 
Truman, Edwin. Sovereign Wealth Funds: Threat or Salvation? (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute, 
2010). Note: The Truman Sovereign Wealth Fund Scoreboard can be found in this publication.
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•  Oversight motivates a government to follow its own rules, meet its own objectives  
or manage public funds in the public interest.
•  Independent oversight provides assurances of integrity that internal controls alone  
cannot provide.
•  Legislatures, the judiciary, regulatory agencies, external auditors, the media, civil society orga-
nizations or citizens provide strong independent oversight of natural resource funds in Alaska 
(USA), Alberta (Canada), Chile, Ghana, Norway, Texas (USA) and Timor-Leste, among others.
•  Natural resource funds in Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Equatorial Guinea, Libya,  
Kazakhstan and Qatar suffer from a lack of independent oversight. In Libya, this has resulted  
in huge losses on fund investments. In Azerbaijan, large arbitrary withdrawals have  
undermined macroeconomic policy objectives without the possibility of objection.
•  Independent oversight bodies can encourage good financial management by praising  
compliance with the rules and good fund governance. In some cases, they can also  
discourage poor behavior by imposing punitive measures ranging from reputational  
damage to fines, imprisonment or international sanctions.
•  Independent oversight is most effective when the oversight body has expertise in the topic 
under investigation, possesses the power or capacity to investigate, has access to information, 
holds enforcement powers, and is integrated with the institutional environment. 
What is independent oversight?
Public oversight is the supervision of government behavior. Oversight bodies identify noncom-
pliance with rules, waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement, and suggest or enforce corrections. 
They are a chief force that induces a government to follow its own rules or principles—and meet 
its own objectives. They can also encourage governments to manage public funds in the public 
interest, rather than for private gain, and to follow the rule of law.
Internal government agencies can provide natural resource fund oversight. In fact, effective 
internal oversight mechanisms may be essential for good natural resource fund management 
(see the RWI-VCC brief on Natural Resource Fund Management). However, independent oversight 
provides assurances of integrity that internal mechanisms alone cannot provide. Truly indepen-
dent oversight bodies are not subject to political interference and provide honest assessments of 
compliance with rules or whether funds are being used for the public benefit.
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Policy Brief Independent oversight bodies gain their influence through different channels. In some cases, 
oversight bodies have the legal authority to force a government to change its behavior (e.g., the 
judiciary; some parliaments; some independent regulatory agencies). In others, they must rely on 
their legal or informal powers to persuade policymakers to change course (e.g., auditor general; 
supervisory committees; international financial institutions). For those without direct access to 
policymakers, they can try to persuade the public or influential groups to pressure the govern-
ment (e.g., media; some civil society groups). 
Why is independent oversight important for natural resource fund governance?
Natural resource fund management may be rules based, discretionary or a combination of the 
two. At one extreme, funds may be governed by a strong set of procedural and transparency rules, 
such as limitations on withdrawals and asset disclosure requirements. The Alaskan (USA),  
Chilean, Ghanaian, Norwegian and Timor-Leste natural resource funds are all governed in this 
way. These rules are usually enacted with the public interest in mind, and there is a general  
expectation that they will be followed. At the opposite extreme, funds may be managed with  
full discretion by the executive or by the Ministry of Finance, as in Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In these cases, natural resource funds may still be governed by a set of 
principles or national policy objectives, such as fiscal sustainability, mitigating Dutch Disease  
or safeguarding resource revenues. 
Whether or not rules are in place, independent oversight bodies have important roles to play in 
promoting good resource revenue governance and holding governments to account. They can 
incentivize compliance with rules or consistency with objectives in a number of ways: First, 
independent oversight bodies can raise concerns or identify gaps in good governance standards 
to help the government implement reforms and manage resource revenues better. For example, 
Ghana’s Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) 2012 report (see Box 1) identified 
gaps in both surface rental payments and receipts from the Saltpond oil field. Within a few days, 
the Ministry of Energy issued a statement offering new information on royalty amounts paid in 
2011 and the unpaid surface rental bill.1 The PIAC report also raised concerns about overly opti-
mistic petroleum revenue projections, which allowed for greater spending under Ghana’s fiscal 
rule. The Ministry of Finance has since committed to addressing this issue, and 2013 projections 
are generally considered to be more realistic. 
Second, independent oversight bodies can draw public and international attention to mismanage-
ment of public funds, putting pressure on a government to rectify problems. In Chad, the Collège 
de Contrôle et de Surveillance des Ressources Pétrolières (aka, the Collège), a multistakeholder 
oversight committee, must approve disbursements from the Chad fund and oversee the manage-
ment and use of revenues from the Chad-Cameroon pipeline. Publication of its 2005 report high-
lighting wells and schools that were paid for but not completed and inflated costs of computers, 
not to mention government efforts to undermine the institution, was a key factor in convincing 
the World Bank to suspend its program in the country.2 
Third, they can provide a check on overconcentration of power in the hands of the executive or 
fund managers. For example, without adequate independent oversight, the executive may freely 
use natural resource fund assets as patronage or may withdraw funds arbitrarily, undermining 
long-term fiscal sustainability or macroeconomic stability objectives, as in the Azerbaijani and 
1  Emma Tarrant Tayou, “Ghana Citizen Oversight Report Yields Debate, Disclosures,” May 25, 2012,  
http://www.revenuewatch.org/news/blog/ghana-citizen-oversight-report-yields-debate-disclosures. 
2  Ian Gary and Nikki Reisch, Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money in Africa’s Newest Petro-State (Catholic Relief Services  
and Bank Information Center, 2005), http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Chads-Oil-Miracle-or-Mirage.pdf; Lydia  
Polgreen, “World Bank Ends Effort to Help Ease Chad Poverty,” New York Times, September 10, 2008.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/world/africa/11chad.html?_r=0. 
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Kuwaiti cases. The threat of parliamentary or judicial hearings or penalties, or reputational  
damage leading to electoral defeat, can be major deterrents. 
Independent oversight bodies
Legislature: Parliaments, congresses and legislative councils are often tasked with reviewing and 
evaluating selected activities of the executive branch of government. In many cases, legislatures 
have an explicit mandate to approve budgets and oversee budget formulation and execution. This 
oversight role often covers the management and flow of funds into and out of natural resource 
funds. In Norway, for example, the Storting (legislative body) is mandated to pass legislation 
governing the fund, approve its annual budget, appoint members of a fund supervisory council 
and review the council’s reports. In addition, legislative committees are often established to hold 
hearings and report on legal compliance, as well as identify cases of government mismanage-
ment. In the Canadian province of Alberta, a standing committee is tasked with reviewing and 
approving the fund business plan annually, reviewing quarterly reports on fund operations,  
approving the fund’s annual report, reporting to the legislature on whether the fund is meeting  
its objectives and holding public meetings with Albertans on fund activities.3 
Judiciary: In many countries, the courts are explicitly mandated to determine the constitutionali-
ty of legislation and ensure government compliance with laws, including those governing natural 
resource fund management. Where the courts are free from political interference, judicial review 
is a strong form of independent oversight insofar as courts are able to enforce their decisions on 
the government. While this type of independent oversight is not commonly used to promote good 
fund governance, there have been cases of judicial review of fund operations. In 2008, the Timor-
Leste appeals court found that a $290.7 million withdrawal from the Petroleum Fund was illegal. 
The rationale was that it violated the 2005 Petroleum Fund Law requirements that the government 
provide a detailed explanation for the withdrawal and that petroleum revenues be managed for 
the benefit of current and future generations.4 
Regulatory Agency: Some countries have established special government agencies to review 
performance of natural resource funds. For example, Norway’s Supervisory Council, consisting of 
15 members chosen by the Storting from Norwegian society, public administration and industry, 
supervises the Norges Bank’s (Norway’s central bank) activities and compliance with its rules, 
including the management of the Government Pension Fund Global. The council has a right to ac-
cess all Norges Bank information and conduct independent investigations. In addition to its own 
investigations, it relies on the external auditor’s statement to write its report, which is submitted 
to the Storting.
Independent Auditor: Some funds, such as Botswana’s Pula Fund and Trinidad and Tobago’s 
Heritage and Stabilization Fund, are subject to audit by an auditor general. In these countries, the 
Office of the Auditor General has a degree of independence; however, this is not always the case. 
In other jurisdictions, independent external audits are also conducted to ensure their integrity. 
For example, Chile’s Economic and Social Stabilization Fund, Norway’s Government Pension Fund 
Global and Texas’ (USA) Permanent University Fund were last audited by Deloitte; Alaska’s (USA) 
Permanent Fund was last audited by KPMG. 
Multistakeholder Group: Some countries have established formal multistakeholder oversight 
bodies to reinforce and support the work of traditional bodies such as parliament and the judi-
ciary or to provide an additional source of oversight. In Chad, Ghana and Timor-Leste, civil society 
3  World Bank Institute, Parliamentary Oversight of the Extractive Industries Sector, 2010. http://www.agora-parl.org/sites/default/ 
files/parliamentary_oversight_and_the_extractive_industries.pdf.




Policy Brief groups such as chartered accountants, trade unions, religious organizations and traditional lead-
ers, as well as those closer to the government such as judges, politicians and central bankers, form 
formal oversight committees. Ghana’s Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) (see 
Box 1) is mandated by law to simply monitor the management of petroleum revenues as outlined 
in the Petroleum Revenue Management Act. Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund Consultative Council 
must advise parliament on fund operations and compliance with the fund’s mandate. Chad’s  
Collège has a stronger mandate not only to ensure that revenue management laws are followed 
but also to approve withdrawals from special oil revenue accounts. Recently, some Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) multistakeholder groups have also begun examining the 
flow of monies into and out of funds. For example, Mongolia’s last EITI report covers payments 
made from the Mongolian-Russian joint state-owned Erdenet Mining Corporation to the Budget 
Stability Fund. 
Media: Television, movie, radio, newspapers and Internet coverage of fund management can  
encourage good fund governance. In Timor-Leste, for example, compliance with the Petroleum 
Fund Law is viewed by a proxy for good governance more generally. News of unjustified  
withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund caused a degree of disenchantment and indignation  
among some voters. In Libya, media coverage of Libyan Investment Authority mismanagement 
is anecdotally contributing to international and domestic congressional efforts to improve the 
fund’s management and procedures. 
International Organizations: A number of international organizations and think tanks provide 
independent assessments of fund operations and management. For example, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) includes regular assessments of natural resource fund performance in its 
Nigerian and Norwegian Article IV consultation reports. The International Working Group on 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWGSWF) government members have released a self-assessment of  
their own adherence to the Santiago Principles (see RWI-VCC brief on Natural Resource Fund 
Transparency). RWI assesses natural resource fund transparency and management as part of its 
Resource Governance Index. And Edwin M. Truman at the Brookings Institution periodically 
grades sovereign wealth funds using indicators of structure, governance, transparency, account-
ability and behavior.
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Policy Brief Box 1: Ghana’s Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC)
In 2011, the Parliament of Ghana passed the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, which included 
the establishment of the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC). The 13 civil society 
members of the committee—who include representatives of the unions, traditional chiefs, journal-
ists, lawyers, chartered accountants and religious groups, and who are appointed by the Minister of 
Finance for two to three year secure terms—were mandated to:
 • Monitor and evaluate compliance with the Petroleum Revenue Management Act;
 •  Provide a platform for public debate on whether petroleum revenues are being used to  
advance development priorities; and
 •  Provide an independent assessment of the management and use of petroleum revenues.
The PIAC represents the only legislated petroleum revenue management oversight body  
consisting entirely of civil society members and therefore completely independent. As such, there 
is keen interest from the international community to determine if it provides an effective model to 
promote compliance with fiscal rules and improve natural resource fund governance.
In May 2012, the PIAC released its first report. It provided basic information on petroleum revenue 
receipts and the flow of funds from the Petroleum Holding Fund to the two natural resource funds 
(Ghana Heritage Fund and Ghana Stabilization Fund), the national budget and the Ghana National 
Petroleum Company (GNPC), Ghana’s national oil company. The PIAC highlighted several major  
challenges facing the system in Ghana, including:
 •  The GNPC retained 47 percent of all petroleum revenue collected in 2012. While legal,  
this represents a large implicit investment in the oil sector at the expense of other sectors.
 •  Under the Ghanaian system, higher revenue forecasts allow for greater spending and  
less saving in natural resource funds. The PIAC revealed that the Ministry of Finance  
overestimated corporate income taxes by nearly 100 percent, thereby creating extra fiscal 
space for the government.
 •  The Ghanaian petroleum revenue management act requires a minimum of 30 percent of oil 
revenue not allocated to the budget or the GNPC to be deposited into the Ghana Heritage 
Fund, with the rest allocated to the Ghana Stabilization Fund. In fact, 21 percent was allocated 
to the Ghana Heritage Fund and 79 percent to the Ghana Stabilization Fund.
Following the release of their report, PIAC members, led by chairman Major Daniel Sowa Ablorh-
Quarcoo, met with officials from the government, including the Ministry of Finance and the GNPC, 
to share their concerns. They also held two public consultations on their findings, one in the oil-
producing region. The press coverage and national debate that ensued led to at least one immediate 
result, the disclosure of new information on oil payments made to the government. While an official 
response to the PIAC’s other concerns has not been released, the PIAC’s next report on the govern-
ment’s management and use of petroleum revenues, due in mid-2013, should provide an indication 
of the committee’s influence.
Conclusion
While there is no one-size-fits-all independent oversight model, several elements can improve 
oversight body effectiveness. First, expertise in natural resource fund management is essential. 
Expertise engenders credibility, which can help persuade policymakers to implement recom-
mendations or influence the public or international community to pressure policymakers. While 
there are individuals and institutions in most countries with a strong understanding of natural 
resource fund governance, oversight bodies can also request support from organizations such as 
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the African Center for Economic Transformation, IMF, Norwegian Agency for Development  
Cooperation, RWI, and the World Bank, to improve their understanding of global good practices. 
Second, the legal power to investigate fund operations could aid in assuring accuracy of  
information and comprehensiveness of assessment reports, provided that oversight bodies  
have easy access to information. Investigative powers also help keep fund managers in check. 
Third, enforcement powers, such as the Chadian Collège’s right to deny withdrawals from the  
oil fund, ensure that the government complies with legal obligations.
Finally, oversight mechanisms should be context specific. For instance, media coverage may  
be most effective in open, democratic societies, while multistakeholder groups may be most  
effective where civil society is an influential force. 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of independent oversight will rely on the supervisory body’s ability 
to incentivize the government to comply with its own rules or meet its own objectives. This can 
be done with carrots—for example, by publicizing that fund performance is improving—or with 
sticks, such as fines or imprisonment by the courts or sanctions by the international community 
for misappropriation of public funds. Which carrots and sticks are most effective depends wholly 
on the country’s political and institutional environment.
86
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1700 Broadway, 17th Floor





435 West 116th Street




A JOINT CENTER OF COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL AND 
THE EARTH INST ITUTE AT  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY
VALE COLUMBIA CENTER
ON SUSTAINABLE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
